Stephen D Aarons, Attorney at Law | Aarons Law PC | New Mexico Criminal Defense Attorney

Author: roadrunner

  • Plea Deal Accepted in Murder/Arson Case

    By Carlos Padilla HERALD Editor

    A plea deal was struck between the State of New Mexico and accused murderer and arsonist Willie Garcia Jr., on Wednesday morning, Nov. 12, in the Seventh Judicial District Courthouse in Truth or Consequences. Mr. Garcia has been incarcerated since shortly after the death of 27-year-old Mical Lee Culpepper, who died in May 2012.

    Sentencing will take place in approximately 45 days.

    If sentenced to the maximum term in prison allowed by law due to this plea agreement – 5-1/2 years – Willie Garcia Jr., may be out of prison before this year’s sophomores at Hot Springs High School receive their diplomas for graduation.

    QUESTION OF COMPETENCY

    On Wednesday morning, Seventh Judicial District Court Chief Judge Kevin Sweazea opened the proceedings for the plea hearing, where Seventh Judicial District Attorney Clint Wellborn went on record as the prosecutor in the case and Steve Aarons went on record as the defense attorney representing Mr. Garcia.

    Judge Sweazea acknowledged that the agenda to last week’s hearing indicated that the court was set to hear the plea and disposition, and that the court had been awaiting a competency report.

    “Has that been prepared?” Judge Sweazea asked.

    “It has, Your Honor,” Mr. Aarons offered, addressing the court, adding that he was filing in open court a notice of withdrawal of the competency issue.

    Mr. Aarons went on to state that he had received a report Monday evening, Nov. 10, that in the opinion of the individual who had prepared the report after interviewing Mr. Garcia, that although Mr. Garcia does “have a history of multiple head injuries, the neuropsychological screening” indicates that “his memory, attention and language skills are sufficient for him to be able to work with his attorney in a rational and factual manner in his defense.”

    Mr. Aarons had in fact been the individual to breech the issue of Mr. Garcia’s competency in the first place.

    In question to the legal matters at hand, Garcia was found to possess “more than an adequate grasp of the fundamentals,” Mr. Aarons stated, reading from the report. “He does have a significant substance abuse history for which he could benefit from treatment. He is to remain on appropriate psychotropic medications to maintain competency.”

    Aarons addressed the court, stating that he was now satisfied, as Garcia’s attorney, that his client’s competency was determined to be intact by the forensic psychologist, who he stated has a distinguished reputation in the state of New Mexico in her field.

    With that said, Mr. Aarons requested that the issue of competency be withdrawn from the court.

    Judge Sweazea, who was given the original report by defense attorney Aarons, ordered that the attorney needed to file the report with the court clerk’s office, as the issue of competency had been raised with the court regarding Mr. Garcia.

    PLEA AGREEMENT

    With that issue being put to bed, so to speak, Judge Sweazea asked the attorneys present in court if they wished to proceed with the plea agreement. Both attorneys stated that they were in fact prepared to proceed.

    District Attorney Wellborn addressed the court, asking to specifically address the matter of Garcia being considered for a habitual offender enhancement.

    Defense attorney Aarons spoke to the habitual offender enhancement, confirming that Mr. Garcia’s prior criminal offense was more than 10 years old, however, because Garcia was not released from probation until 2007, which was within 10 years, that placed Garcia “within the zero to 5-1/2 years.”

    Asking for clarification, Judge Sweazea was told by Mr. Aarons that the figure of 5-1/2 years included the potential prison sentences combined.

    In the portion of the plea agreement that discusses sentencing, Judge Sweazea stated, it references a statute that the offenses are nonviolent offenses. “Does that mean that they are not serious offenses?” he asked District Attorney Wellborn, who stated that the statute does state that the offense included in the plea agreement were considered nonviolent.

    Willie Garcia Jr., was then sworn in by Chief Judge Sweazea.

    reprinted by permission of the Truth or Consequences Herald

  • Wikipedia

    Stephen D Aarons (born: November 23, 1954) is a New Mexico attorney, born in St. Louis and noted for representing clients in death penalty and high profile cases. These include the successful appeal in 2012 of the Marino Leyba, Jr., double murder conviction, and the 2008 Robertson High School hazing case.[3] [4][5] Aarons is an active member in good standing of the New Mexico and Missouri State bar associations, and has been a member of the bar of the United States Supreme Court since 1983.[6] In 1993 Aarons received an AV rating from Martindale-Hubbell,[7][8], and holds the highest possible ratings from Avvo,[9] Superlawyers,[10] and the National Trial Lawyers Association (USA)[11]

    Career

    Early Career

    At the 1975 College Democrats of America convention in Atlanta, Aarons was elected National President and he was reelected the following year at the The Mayflower in the District of Columbia. Aarons participated in a State Department sponsored trip with the United States Youth Council to visit Egyptian President Anwar Sadat and retired Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir as a precursor to their Camp David Accords.[12] After law school, Aarons began his practice of law as a VISTA lawyer in Great Falls, MT. Much of this work was devoted to general civil litigation and misdemeanor defense for Native American clients including members of the Niitsítapi or Blackfeet Nation. Aarons was then commissioned as a United States Army Judge Advocate. After completing the Basic Course, Aarons was assigned to the VII Corps in Augsburg, (West) Germany. Months later, Aarons received orders to serve as the Command Judge Advocate for the United States Army Field Station Augsburg. During three years on active duty in Augsburg, Aarons prosecuted over 50 courts-martial and acted as individual defense counsel in the murder trial of an American Serviceman in Nürnberg, (West) Germany and served in that capacity in several other courts-martial throughout Europe.[13] Aarons was a SOFA legal observer for criminal trials in Germany courts against defendants who were United States citizens and also inspected German prisons where United States citizens remained in custody. In 1983, Aarons was admitted to the bar of the Supreme Court of the United States.[14]

    Oxford Debate

    After Aarons completed his three year tour of active duty, he remained in Europe and studied International Law at Oxford University while residing with the De La Salle Brothers and Greyfriars at their 1 Marston Ferry residence. During residence, Aarons taught University of Maryland evening law courses to US airman at RAF Upper Heyford. Aarons agreed to take the Second Affirmative in a Oxford Union debate entitled “There is no moral difference between the foreign policies of the United States and the Soviet Union.” British Leftist Professor E. P. Thompson and US Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger were the keynote speakers. Aarons, then a US Army Reserve Captain and Judge Advocate, spoke in favor of the proposition in part because of widespread concerns over the USS New Jersey recently firing hundreds of rounds from its 16″ guns into Beruit, Lebanon, destroying a hospital and killing countless civilians (See USS New Jersey in the Lebanese Civil War), all in retaliation for the suicide bombing of 288 US Marines there. (See 1983 Beirut Barracks Bombing). Both Thompson and Weinberger referred to Aarons’ argument, Weinberger straying from his typed script[15] to praise the young Captain while pointing out that such dissent by a Soviet counterpart might have resulted in his court-martial! [16]. Somewhat surprisingly, Weinberger won this debate, by a vote of 271 to 240, [17] thereby astonishing the American embassy staff in London, which had urged him not to participate in it, [18] and eliciting a congratulatory phone call early the next morning from British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. [19] According to John Lewis Gaddis in his article “On Moral Equivalency and Cold War History” in Ethics & International Affairs, Volume 10 (1996), Weinberger was instrumental later that month in withdrawing the USS New Jersey and formulating a different strategy for the United States in the Middle East. [20]

    Capital Defender

    By 1985, Aarons had returned to the United States and became employed as an assistant public defender in Clovis, New Mexico, moving the next year to Santa Fe. There he was assigned as defense counsel in several dozen death penalty cases. He assisted Governor Toney Anaya in the commutation of death sentences for all five death row inmates in New Mexico including Aarons’ client Eddie Lee Adams,[21] due to growing opposition in New Mexico to capital punishment. Even after Aarons left the public defender department for private practice, he continued to accept assignments under Public Defender contract to handle death penalty cases until 2009, when New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson signed into law a bill abolishing capital punishment in thst state.[22]

    Private Practice

    In 1989 until 1992, Aarons practiced civil and criminal law at the Jones Firm[23] in Santa Fe. Since November 1992 he has remained in private practice as the managing partner of Aarons Law Firm PC,[24] accepting state and federal criminal cases throughout New Mexico.

    Notable Cases

    Torreon Cabin Murders

    In 1997 Aarons was hired to represent Shaun Wilkins, who was accused with three others in the 1995 murders of Ben Anaya Jr., 17; his girlfriend, Cassandra Sedillo, 23; and her two sons, Matthew Garcia, 3, and Johnny Ray Garcia, 4. The four were found dead in a cabin in April of 1996 in the Manzano Mountains near Torreon, New Mexico.[25] The case against Wilkins was weak,[26][27] the trial ended with a hung jury, and the district attorney eventually declined to retry the case.[28] [29] In 2002 Wilkins and codefendant Roy Buchner hired civil rights attorney Ray Twohig to file a lawsuit against police for malicious prosecution in the Torreon case. In January 2011 a federal jury declined to award damages to them.[30] Two other defendants were found guilty; Lawrence Nieto was convicted before the Wilkins trial and was originally sentenced to 130 years in prison. Errors in the prosecution caused Nieto’s conviction to be overturned, and before Nieto’s retrial he brokered a plea agreement involving a 39 year sentence. NM Corrections officials have twice mistakenly released Nieto. [31]

    Robert Fry Trials

    In 2002 Aarons accepted a special NM Public Defender contract to represent Robert Fry, who had already been convicted in the death of Betty Lee, 36 from Shiprock, NM. Fry had received a death sentence for the Lee murder but was also facing first degree murder counts involving the 1996 fatal stabbings of 18-year-old Matthew Trecker and 25-year-old Joseph Fleming at a counter culture store in Farmington, NM, and throwing 40-year-old Donald Tsosie off a cliff in Navajo country.[32] During a police interview, Fry implicated himself in the earlier crimes and gave detailed “theories” of how the crimes were carried out. [33][34] Robert Fry was found guilty again in the Tsosie trial, and a third time in the Trecker and Fleming trial. Unlike the death sentence in Lee, the juries in Tsosia and Trecker/Fleming did not impose the death penalty. Despite New Mexico’s abolition of capital punishment, Robert Fry and another man were grandfathered and, as a result, Fry remains on death row awaiting execution for the muirder of Betty Lee.[35]

    LANL Security Breach

    The family of Jessica Quintana hired Aarons in 2006 to represent her for sneaking classified documents out of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL). Hired right out of high school, Quintana could not finish her work before the contract deadline and decided to take some of the classified work home; she walked unchallenged into her top secret vault and downloaded information onto a computer flash drive. She also removed 228 pages of classified documents about underground nuclear weapons tests in the 1970s, and took the material home.[36] The case received international attention from the media including a special report by CBS Evening News, a front page article in Newsweek,[37] and articles in the London Times and the Washington Post.[38] As soon as Aarons brokered a plea bargain with the Department of Justice, Quintana pled guilty to one misdemeanor, received one year of supervised release, and cooperated fully with FBI investigators.[39]

    Tak and Pung Sil Yi Murder

    In 2007 Tak and Pung Sil Yi were brutally murdered in their Albuquerque home. Two magazine salespeople, Michael Lee and Travis Rowley, were charged with capital murder. Aarons acted as defense counsel for Rowley, while Lisa Hood acted for Michael Lee. Defense counsel argued Rowley’s confession was obtained via trickery, which was supported by the lack of forensic evidence linking the pair to the crime. Charges were eventually dismissed after another man, Clifton Bloomfield, connected to the scene by forensic evidence, confessed to the murders. [40][41]. The City of Albuquerque settled with Lee in his civil rights lawsuit, agreeing to pay him $950,000 in damages.[42]. Rowley’s suit is pending trial.

    Robertson High School Hazing Case

    In 2008, the national media learned of a hazing incident at the Robertson High School in Las Vegas, New Mexico.[43] involving five football players as respondents: Michael G (age 17); Lucas M (17); and Steven G (17); Marcus G (16); and, Santiago A (16). Santiago’s family hired Aarons, who maintained the allegations were overblown and, while a horrible hazing situation had occurred, Santiago was not an active participant. [44] The case drew national attention ending up on CBS and Fox News.[45][46][47] In the end Santiago would enter a plea of no contest. Judge Jim Hill agreed with the defense arguments, saying, “Based upon what I have heard in the evidence … it is my belief that you have less involvement than the other five individuals involved in this case.” Instead of putting Santiago in detention, Judge Hill originally sentenced Santiago to community service and sealed his juvenile adjudication from the public.[48] Six victims later sued the school board, and received a $5.25 million settlement.[49]

    Hernandez Medicaid Trial

    In 2012 Aarons found himself enlisted as a defense attorney in a Medicaid fraud case. His client Catherine Hernandez and her husband Joe were charged with Medicaid fraud and falsifying documents[50] related to their 29 and 32 year old sons with spina bifida. Aarons maintained Hernandez and her husband were being unfairly prosecuted for mistakes on complicated paperwork, which happened due to the elimination of case workers by the state. The Hernandezes were convicted by a Jury in January 2012. [51][52] The couple were later ordered to repay $59,000.00.[53] In light of their conviction Aarons told the ABQJournal Medicaid needed to provide better guidance on complex billing by family care providers so that others didn’t end up facing similar prosecution.[54] The case has been used as an example by some to suggest New Mexico needs to improve its Human Services Departments monitoring of Medicaid, is alleged to be prone to waste.[55]

    Terry Clark

    As a public defender, Aarons represented two capital defendants who were spared death warrants but, after being tried a second time years later, both were sentenced to death and were executed. In 1986, appellate defender Sheila Lewis and Aarons were assigned to represent Terry Clark. Clark had confessed to his minister to killing a young child. In a rare legal maneuver, Clark pled guilty to first degree murder in hopes of being sentenced before Governor Toney Anaya completed his term of office. However, district judge Stanley F. Frost refused to hold a sentence hearing before Anaya’s last day in office and, as a result, Clark was not among the five men on death row whose death sentences were commuted by Anaya to life in prison without possibility of parole. The following year, a jury in Tucumcari, New Mexico returned with a death sentence against Clark. The New Mexico Supreme Court eventually overturned that sentence, however, finding reversible error in misleading the jury as to the meaning of life in prison. Clark was entitled to another trial and the NM Public Defenders assigned a prominent capital defense lawyer, Gary Mitchell, to represent Clark. Aarons testified at the 1996 retrial in Silver City, New Mexico. So did former governor Anaya, who testified why he would have commuted Clark’s sentence had he the legal authority to do so. The second jury also returned a death sentence and, after Clark abandoned his habeas corpus petition, he was executed by lethal injection on 6 November 2001.[56] [57]

    Gregg Braun

    In 1989, Aarons represented Gregg Braun. Braun was eventually convicted of killing five people in four states, the last victim at a truck stop in Springer, New Mexico. Braun was the son of a prominent Kansas lawyer, Lelyn Braun, had a college degree in criminal justice, and no criminal history before his week long cocaine induced killing spree.[58] Aarons handled Braun’s preliminary hearing as to the Springer murder and negotiated with New Mexico prosecutors. Gary Mitchell eventually tried the case in Las Vegas, New Mexico and Braun was found guilty but mentally ill. The New Mexico jury spared Braun a death sentence, as did juries in Kansas and Texas. However Oklahoma imposed the death penalty as to the murder in its jurisdiction, and Braun was executed on July 20, 2000.[59].

    Other Cases

    Aarons handled countless other high profile cases throughout the State of New Mexico, including:

    • In 1986, Cloyd Norman Hall was arrested in Tucumcari, New Mexico for the fatal shooting of a state policeman[60] [61] and faced a death penalty trial in Fort Sumner, New Mexico.[62] The jury acquitted Hall of first degree murder, and he was sentenced by Judge Stanley F. Frost for lesser crimes.

    • In the October 1988 trial of David Morton for the murder of his Santa Fe neighbor, Terri Lynn Mulvaney,[63] the judge declared a hung jury after eleven of twelve jurors voted not guilty.[64] The lone holdout was the foreman. Twenty years later, Morton confessed in prison to several murders including Mulvaney, and was sentenced to life in prison as to each.[65]

    • Later that month, Samuel Edward Wilson of Mountainair, New Mexico was convicted of murder for hire, but all twelve jurors voted to spare his life from the death penalty.[66]. Aarons represented Wilson before the New Mexico Supreme Court, which overturned the conviction two years later.[67]

    • Pierre Burck, ex Marine, acquitted in the 1999 homicide of his cousin in Ohkay Owingeh, New Mexico[68]

    • Alfredo DeVargas was acquitted in Tierra Amarilla, New Mexico for the February 2001 fatal shooting Lloyd Griego.[69]

    • Fred Mestas claimed self defense and in 2002 was acquitted in the Cottonwood Trailer Park homicide in Santa Fe.[70]

    • In 2003, Orlando Torrez fatally shot a young woman at a party in Taos, New Mexico.. After his conviction of first degree murder, Aarons represented him on appeal and the New Mexico Supreme Court overturned his conviction.[71] Torrez was retried and again convicted of first degree murder.[72]

    • Anthony Anaya, a Santa Fe tow truck driver, was acquitted of murder in the November 2004 shooting death of a suspected drug dealer, claiming to have been at the “wrong place, wrong time.”[73] Two other defendants were later convicted of murder.[74]

    • Elias Romero was tried in 2008 for murder and aggravated arson. Three others had already been tried and convicted.[75] The Taos jury acquitted Romero of all counts.[76]

    Personal Life

    In 1954, Steve Costello was born in St. Louis to Donald Eugene Costello and Teddye Ann [nee Ward] Costello and was raised with two younger brothers Kenneth (1957) and Thomas Costello (1961). The family lived in Chicago from 1957 to 1967 and then returned to Ballwin, Missouri where Costello graduated in 1972 from Parkway West High School. Costello received his undergraduate degree from George Washington University and his law degree from Saint Louis University Law School. Costello attempted in May and June 1979, with his brother Tom Costello paddling a donated Fulbot kayak, to break the world record for longest journey swimming set in 1932. They began on the Missouri River just below the dam in Yankton, South Dakota and continued into the Mississippi River until arriving at Cairo, Illinois where a water spout halted the project.[77]. After a failed wedding engagement in 1979, Costello changed his name to Stephen Donald Aarons.

    Aarons married Doris Valdez in a private civil ceremony in 1992 before Justice Stanley Frost and, the following year, they renewed their vows in the Blessed Sacrament Chapel of Saint Francis Cathedral. They have one child, Ian (b. 1996). They built their retirement home in the foothills above Tesuque, New Mexico. Doris and Ian are recognized by the Apache nation due to ancestral blood.

    In 2008, after twenty-eight years of reserve service, Aarons retired from the US Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps[78] as a Lieutenant Colonel. Aarons helped coach his son’s Carlos Gilbert elementary school basketball team, which went undefeated one year,[79], and a regional championship little league baseball squad. Aarons served four years as head coach of the St. Michael’s High School chess team; in Ian’s last year at St. Michael’s, the chess team took home the 2012 NMAA state championship trophy.[80]

    External Links

    New Mexico Criminal Defense Lawyers Association
    Who’s Who in American Law
    Avvo Biography
    National Institute for Trial Advocacy
    US Army Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School Alumni
    Martindale-Hubbell Legal Directory
    College Democrats of America
    Aarons Law PC

    References

    1. ↑ Avvo.com – Santa Fe Attorney Stephen Aarons
    2. ↑ Avvo.com – Santa Fe Attorney Stephen Aarons
    3. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Robertson High School Hazing Case
    4. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Court Overturns Santa Fe Murder Convictions
    5. ↑ ABQ Journal: Murder Convictions Tossed
    6. ↑ Avvo.com – Santa Fe Attorney Stephen Aarons
    7. ↑ Martindale Hubbell Ratings
    8. ↑ Martindale Hubbell: Stephen Aarons
    9. ↑ 10.0/10.0 Avvo Rating.
    10. ↑ New Mexico Superlawyer (2007). Retrieved on 17 December 2012.
    11. ↑ The National Association of Trial Lawyers: Top 100 Profile
    12. ↑ “Anwar el-Sadat, the Daring Arab Pioneer of Peace”. NY Times. 7 October 1981. http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/bday/1225.html. Retrieved 14 December 2012.
    13. ↑ National Trial Lawyers Association Top 100: Background on Stephen D. Aarons
    14. ↑ Directory of Bar of US Supreme Court.
    15. ↑ Air Force Magazine: September 2012
    16. ↑ National Review: Yank at Oxford
    17. ↑ New York Times: Weinburger Victorious at Oxford Debate
    18. ↑ Weinberger Urged Not to Participate in Debate
    19. ↑ British PM Thatcher Congratulates Weinberger
    20. ↑ Weinberger Instrumental in withdrawing USS New Jersey
    21. ↑ Eddie Lee Adams Death Sentence Commuted. Retrieved on 15 December 2012.
    22. ↑ Death Penalty Info. Retrieved on 14 December 2012.
    23. ↑ Jones Firm. Retrieved on 14 December 2012.
    24. ↑ Aarons Law Firm PC. Retrieved on 14 December 2012.
    25. ↑ ABQ Journal: Nieto Sentanced to 39 Years in Torrean Cabin Murders
    26. ↑ Steve Terrell (July 1, 1997). “Lopez Trial Delayed”. Santa Fe New Mexican: pp. B-2. http://newspaperarchive.com/santa-fe-new-mexican/1997-07-01/page-8?tag=wilkins+torreon&rtserp=tags/wilkins?ndt=by&py=1997&pey=1997&plo=torreon.
    27. ↑ Ollie Reed Jr (9/22/1997). “Wilkins’ attorney lays cabin killings on Popeleski”. Albuquerque Tribune: p. A1. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-108371237/wilkins-attorney-lays-cabin.html. “Retitling the Torreon cabin killings case “Popcorn’s Last Revenge,” defense attorney Stephen Aarons told a jury today that the shooter in the grisly deaths is not his client, Shaun Wilkins.”
    28. ↑ Leslie Hoffman (09/01/1999). “Popeleski guilty in deaths of 2 children”. The Albuquerque Tribune. http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-108347190/popeleski-guilty-deaths-2.html.
    29. ↑ Man Convicted in Cabin Killings gets 39 Years
    30. ↑ Jury Declines to Award Damages.
    31. ↑ Man Convicted in Cabin Killings Released Early
    32. ↑ Scott, Robert (2005). Monster Slayer. United States: Pinnacle. pp. 320. ISBN0786016035. http://www.amazon.com/Monster-Slayer-Robert-Scott/dp/0786016035.
    33. ↑ ABQ Journal:Man Convicted of Two Murders
    34. ↑ AVVO.com: Legal Cases
    35. ↑ New York Times: Death Penalty Repealed in New Mexico
    36. ↑ CBS News: Los Alamos Breach Easy
    37. ↑ “Trailer, Secrets and Los Alamos; How could a clerk walk off with a nuclear trove?”. Newsweek. 11/13/2006. http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-154036293.html. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    38. ↑ ABC News: Guilty Plea is Los Alamos Security Breach
    39. ↑ AQB Journal: Former Los Alamos Archivist Pleads to a Single Charge
    40. ↑ Attorney: Prosecutors tricked Rowley
    41. ↑ Charges Against Lee, Rowley Dropped
    42. ↑ “Albuquerque To Pay $950K in Yi Murders”. Albuquerque Journal. June 22, 2011. http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2011/06/22/news/albuquerque-to-pay-950k-in-yi-murders.html.
    43. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Hazing & Rape Allegations Emerge
    44. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Retiring DA Might Keep Hazing Case
    45. ↑ CBS News: New Mexico Hazing Case
    46. ↑ KRQE: Catalogue and Chronology of Robertson High Hazing Case
    47. ↑ Fox News: Horrific High School Hazing Case Shocks New Mexico
    48. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Judge Sentences Teen to Community Service
    49. ↑ “$5.25M Settles Hazing Suit”. Sep 2, 2011. http://www.abqjournal.com/main/2011/09/02/north/525m-settles-hazing-lawsuit-2.html. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    50. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: AG accuses S.F. couple of Medicaid fraud
    51. ↑ Santa Fe New Mexican: Couple Convicted of Medicaid Fraud
    52. ↑ High Beam Research: Santa Fe Husband and Wife found Guilty of Fraud
    53. ↑ New Mexico Attorney Generals Office: Couple Ordered to Repay $59,000.00
    54. ↑ ABQ Journal North: Couple Convicted of Fraud
    55. ↑ SF Reporter: Rate of Return
    56. ↑ Clark execution.
    57. ↑ Child’s killer executed.
    58. ↑ Braun gravesite.
    59. ↑ Braun murders.
    60. ↑ Cloyd Norman Hall, 107 N.M. 17 (1987).
    61. ↑ “Accused cop killer jailed in Santa Fe”. Santa Fe New Mexican. 04/30/1986. http://newspaperarchive.com/santa-fe-new-mexican/1986-04-30/page-19. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    62. ↑ Jonathan, Abbott. Hall Successful Defense. Retrieved on 17 December 2012.
    63. ↑ Mark Utgaard (09/30/1988). Serial Killer Theory Aired “Serial killer theory aired as trial opens”. Santa Fe New Mexican: p. A3. http://newspaperarchive.com/santa-fe-new-mexican/1988-09-30/page-3?tag=david+morton&rtserp=tags/?pc=25876&psi=66&pci=7&pt=10637&pep=david-morton Serial Killer Theory Aired.
    64. ↑ Mark C. Utgaard (10/13/1988). “Mistrial declared in murder case after jurors deadlock”. The New Mexican: p. A-1, 2. http://newspaperarchive.com/santa-fe-new-mexican/1988-10-13/page-1/.
    65. ↑ Steve Terrell (2/8/2003). Finally, Closure “Finally, closure”. Santa Fe New Mexican: pp. A1, A8. http://newspaperarchive.com/tags/?pc=25876&psi=66&pci=7&pt=10637&pep=david-morton Finally, Closure.
    66. ↑ Mark C. Utgaard (10/28/1988). “Wilson gets life in murder-for-hire case”. Santa Fe New Mexican: p. A1. “Defense lawyers get something too – sharp rebuke from irked jury”
    67. ↑ Kay Bird (02/16/1990). Santa Fe New Mexican: p. B3. “The high court, voting 4-1, voided the conviction of Ed Wilson”
    68. ↑ “Jury Acquits Ex Marine”. The New Mexican. 14 July 1999. http://newspaperarchive.com/santa-fe-new-mexican/1999-07-14/. Retrieved 16 December 2012.
    69. ↑ Geogg Grammer (04/12/2002). “Jury: Man acted in self-defense”. The Santa Fe New Mexican: p. B-1.
    70. ↑ “Jury Says Killing Self Defense”. Albuquerque Journal. http://business.highbeam.com/2872/article-1G1-84119452/jury-says-killing-selfdefense. Retrieved 16 December 2012.
    71. ↑ Barry Massey (6/3/2009). “State court overturns sentence in Taos Murder”. Associated Press. http://www.masnewmexico.com/index.php?view=article&catid=64%3Asanta-fe&id=446%3Astate-court-overturns-sentence-in-taos-murder&format=pdf&option=com_content&lang=en. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    72. ↑ Vic Vela (5/26/2010). “Man Guilty in Murder – Again, first conviction overturned”. Albuquerque Journal North. http://www.abqjournal.com/north/262348302902north05-26-10.htm. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    73. ↑ Pawloski, Jeremy (05 November 2005). “Man Acquitted in Drug Dealer’s Death”. Albuquerque Journal North. http://www.abqjournal.com/north/405379north_news11-05-05.htm. Retrieved 16 December 2012.
    74. ↑ Jeremy Pawloski (11/19/2005). [but two other defendants were convicted “Couple Convicted in Shooting Death”]. Albuquerque Journal North: p. A1. but two other defendants were convicted.
    75. ↑ “Final trial begins in 2003 murder”. Taos News. 02/28/2008. http://www.taosnews.com/news/article_50703ec7-0e96-50dd-bd93-7c8516f62a89.html. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    76. ↑ “Fourth Defendant Found Not Guilty”. Albuquerque Journal North. 02/29/2008. http://www.abqjournal.com/north/289315north_news02-29-08.htm. Retrieved 17 December 2012.
    77. ↑ http://www.guinnessworldrecords.com/world-records/2000/longest-journey-swimming World Record in Long Distance Swimming Broken
    78. ↑ Army JAG Corps Reserves. Retrieved on 15 December 2012.
    79. ↑ Boys team Undefeated Season City Champs. Carlos Gilbert PTK News. Retrieved on 04/02/2008.
    80. ↑ [www.nmsco.org/StandingsStateNMAA2010.pdf 2012 Standings].
    This article uses material from the Wikipedia article Stephen Aarons, that was deleted or is being discussed for deletion, which is released under the Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License.

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  • State v. Hubble

    206 P.3d 579 2009 NMSC 014

    STATE of New Mexico, Plaintiff-Respondent,
    v.
    Rich HUBBLE, Defendant-Petitioner.

    No. 30,663.

    Supreme Court of New Mexico.

    March 31, 2009.

    [206 P.3d 581]

            Hugh W. Dangler, Chief Public Defender, Nancy M. Hewitt, Appellate Defender, Kathleen T. Baldridge, Assistant Appellate Defender, Santa Fe, NM, for Petitioner.

            Gary K. King, Attorney General, Anita Carlson, Assistant Attorney General, Santa Fe, NM, for Respondent.

            Donna M. Bevacqua-Young, John Ward Wheeler, II, Santa Fe, NM, for Amici Curiae, New Mexico District Attorneys’ Association and New Mexico Department of Public Safety.

    OPINION

            SERNA, Justice.

            {1} Defendant Rich Hubble was convicted in magistrate court of Driving Under The Influence of Intoxicating Liquor, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-8-102 (1953, as amended through 2004), and Improper Turning at Intersection, contrary to NMSA 1978, Section 66-7-325(A) (1978). Pursuant to Rule 6-703 NMRA, he appealed to the district court. During the district court bench trial, Defendant moved to suppress the evidence that was obtained from the traffic stop, which he claimed was conducted without reasonable suspicion. The district court denied the motion and Defendant was once again convicted of the same two offenses. Defendant appealed the district court’s judgment and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted Defendant’s petition for writ of certiorari on the issue of whether the initial traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion that he violated a traffic law. We hold that the traffic stop was based upon reasonable suspicion and we affirm the denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress.

    [206 P.3d 582]

            I. BACKGROUND

            {2} On the evening of February 15, 2005, Deputy Phillip Francisco was driving southbound on County Road 6100 when he observed Defendant’s vehicle come to a stop at a “T” intersection between County Road 6100 and an unnamed access road. Aside from the vehicles belonging to Deputy Francisco and Defendant, there were no other vehicles on either the county road or the access road. As Deputy Francisco passed through the intersection, he observed that Defendant did not have his turn signal engaged. Deputy Francisco continued to observe the vehicle through his rearview mirror as he proceeded southbound and never saw the turn signal engaged. Deputy Francisco then observed Defendant turn onto County Road 6100 without using his turn signal. Defendant and his passenger both testified that Defendant did turn on his signal before turning right onto Country Road 6100. Deputy Francisco pulled over to the side of the road about one hundred feet past the intersection and waited for Defendant to pass him. Deputy Francisco then proceeded to make the traffic stop on the basis that Defendant turned without using his signal.

            {3} Deputy Francisco approached the vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol on Defendant’s breath and observed that Defendant had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Deputy Francisco also observed Defendant act in a slow, impaired, and disoriented manner when he was retrieving his license and registration. Deputy Francisco ordered Defendant to exit his vehicle and observed Defendant swaying and losing his balance when standing. Deputy Francisco asked Defendant if he had been drinking and Defendant responded by saying that he had consumed one beer. Deputy Francisco then had Defendant undergo the horizontal gaze nystagmus, the walk-and-turn, and the one-leg stand tests. Defendant failed all three tests and Deputy Francisco placed him under arrest. Defendant consented to two breath tests and the results indicated that he had a blood alcohol content of 0.12 and 0.10, respectively. Deputy Francisco issued Defendant a citation for DWI and for Improper Turning at Intersection.

            {4} At trial, Deputy Francisco acknowledged that the turn signal statute dictates that a driver use the turn signal in order to indicate to other traffic in which direction the driver intends to travel. Deputy Francisco testified that he considered himself to be traffic that night.

            II. DISCUSSION

            A. Standard of Review

            {5} “In reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress, we observe the distinction between factual determinations which are subject to a substantial evidence standard of review and application of law to the facts[,] which is subject to de novo review.” State v. Nieto, 2000-NMSC-031, ¶ 19, 129 N.M. 688, 12 P.3d 442 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “We view the facts in the manner most favorable to the prevailing party and defer to the district court’s findings of fact if substantial evidence exists to support those findings.” State v. Urioste, 2002-NMSC-023, ¶ 6, 132 N.M. 592, 52 P.3d 964. “Questions of reasonable suspicion are reviewed de novo by looking at the totality of the circumstances to determine whether the detention was justified.” State v. Robbs, 2006-NMCA-061, ¶ 9, 139 N.M. 569, 136 P.3d 570.

            {6} Defendant did not assert that the New Mexico Constitution afforded him greater protection than the federal Constitution, so we only address the issue of reasonable suspicion under federal Fourth Amendment law. See State v. Gomez, 1997-NMSC-006, ¶¶ 22-23, 122 N.M. 777, 932 P.2d 1.

            {7} “Both the United State Constitution and the New Mexico Constitution protect a citizen against unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 12, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. Since an automobile stop is considered a “seizure” under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, it must “be conducted in a reasonable manner to satisfy the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Duran, 2005-NMSC-034, ¶ 22, 138 N.M. 414, 120 P.3d 836. “Before a police officer makes a traffic stop, he must have a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.” State v. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020,

    [206 P.3d 583]

    ¶ 6, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163. We analyze the reasonableness of a stop in accordance with the two-part test set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968):(1) whether the stop was justified at its inception and (2) whether the officer’s action was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference.” Funderburg, 2008-NMSC-026, ¶ 13, 144 N.M. 37, 183 P.3d 922. Because there are no allegations that Deputy Francisco exceeded the scope of the initial interference, we need only examine the first part of the test—whether the stop was justified at its inception.

            {8} “A reasonable suspicion is a particularized suspicion, based on all the circumstances that a particular individual, the one detained, is breaking, or has broken, the law.” State v. Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. “The test is an objective one. The subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity of the stop; it is the evidence known to the officer that counts, not the officer’s view of the governing law.” State v. Muñoz, 1998-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 765, 965 P.2d 349. We objectively examine whether the facts available to the officer warrant the officer, as a person of reasonable caution, to believe the action taken was appropriate. State v. Madsen, 2000-NMCA-050, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 251, 5 P.3d 573. We will find reasonable suspicion “if the officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational inferences from those facts, that, when judged objectively, would lead a reasonable person to believe criminal activity occurred or was occurring.” State v. Taylor, 1999-NMCA-022, ¶ 7, 126 N.M. 569, 973 P.2d 246 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

            B. Section 66-7-325(A) Requires Engagement of a Turn Signal When There is a Reasonable Possibility That Other Traffic May Be Affected

            {9} The determination of whether Deputy Francisco had reasonable suspicion to make the traffic stop does not hinge on whether Defendant actually violated the underlying turn signal statute. See State v. Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, ¶ 12, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161 (holding that, regardless of whether the defendant was ultimately convicted of careless driving, the officer had reasonable suspicion that he was driving carelessly and the stop was therefore justified). For clarity, we nonetheless take this opportunity to discuss Section 66-7-325(A) and review Defendant’s Improper Turning at Intersection conviction.

            {10} “The primary goal in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the Legislature’s intent;” we first look at the words chosen by the Legislature and the plain meaning of those words. State v. Davis, 2003-NMSC-022, ¶ 6, 134 N.M. 172, 74 P.3d 1064. Under the plain meaning rule, when a statute’s language is “clear and unambiguous,” we will give effect to the language and refrain from further statutory interpretation. State v. Rivera, 2004-NMSC-001, ¶ 10, 134 N.M. 768, 82 P.3d 939. We will not read into a statute language which is not there, especially when it makes sense as it is written. Burroughs v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Bernalillo County, 88 N.M. 303, 306, 540 P.2d 233, 236 (1975).

            {11} Section 66-7-325(A) provides in pertinent part: “No person shall . . . turn any vehicle without giving an appropriate signal . . . in the event any other traffic may be affected by such movement.” Thus, there are two elements in the statute that must be satisfied in order for its mandate to be triggered: (1) there must be other “traffic” (2) that “may be affected” by the motorist’s turn.

            {12} The “traffic” element is easily interpreted and any questions regarding its application in this case are easily resolved given the factual scenario. In interpreting the “traffic” element, we look to how the word is defined in our Motor Vehicle Code: “pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles and other conveyances either singly or together using any highway for purposes of travel.” NMSA 1978, § 66-1-4.17(F) (1990, as amended through 2007). Thus, there is no doubt that Deputy Francisco, who was driving a vehicle on a highway, was “traffic” under Section 66-7-325(A). The more contentious

    [206 P.3d 584]

    question deals with the “may be affected” element.

            {13} We first look to the plain meaning of the words chosen by the Legislature and in particular, the word “may.” Black’s Law Dictionary defines “may” as “[t]o be a possibility.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1000 (8th ed. 2004). Webster’s Dictionary defines it as “[u]sed to indicate a certain measure of likelihood or possibility.” Webster’s II: New Riverside University Dictionary 734 (1988). Thus, the concept of “possibility” is common to both definitions. To this end, it is significant that the Legislature chose the phrase “may be affected” as opposed to “is affected,” “will be affected,” or “most likely will be affected.” We understand this to mean that the Legislature’s intent was to provide Section 66-7-325(A) with a broad reach, requiring a signal even when there is only a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected by the signaling driver’s movement. Thus, under the plain meaning rule, we read the phrase “may be affected” to mean when there is a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected.

            {14} This interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) aligns with the policy and concerns that the New Mexico Motor Vehicle Division expressed in the New Mexico Driver Manual. See Motor Vehicle Div., New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, New Mexico Driver Manual 19 (2004) [hereinafter New Mexico Driver Manual]. In the section titled “Letting Others Know What You Are Doing,” the manual states: “Generally other drivers expect you to keep doing what you are doing. You must warn them when you are going to change direction or slow down. This will give them time to react if needed, or at least not be surprised by what you do.” Id. The manual further instructs drivers to signal when they change direction, turn right or left, merge into traffic, or park so that other drivers will have time to react to such movements. Id. Thus, requiring motorists to signal before they turn when there is a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected by such a turn not only reduces the chance that other drivers would be surprised, but also increases the time that other drivers have to react to such movements.

            {15} Given this interpretation, we now turn to the application of Section 66-7-325(A) to the facts of this case. In their arguments regarding whether Deputy Francisco was “other traffic [that] may be affected” under the meaning of the statute, the parties advocated for different snapshots of time from which this issue should be analyzed. Defendant argued that the issue be determined by analyzing Deputy Francisco at the point in time when he had already passed through the intersection and pulled over to the side of the road. Conversely, the State argued for an extended period of time—the time from when Deputy Francisco was approaching the intersection, including the time he passed through the intersection, until the time he pulled over onto the side of the road.

            {16} In holding that Deputy Francisco was not traffic that may have been affected by Defendant’s turn, the Court of Appeals endorsed the Defendant’s proposed snapshot in time: “[t]he State has not directed our attention to any evidence that Deputy Francisco believed that Defendant’s right turn itself presented a potential hazard to him (the only traffic present) as he observed the turn in his rearview mirror from 100 feet down the road . . . .” State v. Hubble, No. 26,452, slip. op. at 3 (N.M.Ct.App. Sept. 10, 2007) (emphasis added).

            {17} Given our interpretation that Section 66-7-325(A) requires a motorist to give the appropriate signal when there is a reasonable possibility that other traffic may be affected by a turn, we believe that the time period during which there was such a possibility that Deputy Francisco may have been affected by Defendant’s turn encompassed the time that Deputy Francisco was approaching and passing through the intersection. The broad reach and underlying policy of Section 66-7-325(A) dictate that the effect that one driver’s movement may have on another driver is not confined to the point in time when the actual, physical movement occurs. Rather, the effect also involves a driver’s decision-making process in the time leading up to the movement. A driver, once given a visual cue that indicates another driver’s intention, may decide to switch lanes, slow down, or prepare for a change in direction.

    [206 P.3d 585]

    When a driver engages his or her turn signal, it also communicates to other motorists that the driver is aware of their presence on the road. Thus, to consider that other traffic may be affected only at the time of the actual, physical movement unduly limits the broad reach of 66-7-325(A) and undermines our policy of giving drivers ample time to react to the future movements of other drivers on the road. See New Mexico Driver Manual at 19.

            {18} Further, subsection (B) of the statute reinforces the notion that the time period before the actual, physical movement of a driver is pertinent to the determination of Section 66-7-325 violations. It provides: “[a] signal of intention to turn right or left when required shall be given continuously during not less than the last one hundred feet traveled by the vehicle before turning.” Section 66-7-325(B). Thus, because we have determined that Deputy Francisco was “other traffic [that] may [have been] affected,” Defendant should have engaged his right turn signal at least one hundred feet before the intersection. Such indication would have alerted Deputy Francisco as to Defendant’s intention before Deputy Francisco reached the intersection.

            {19} The Court of Appeals also unreasonably narrowed the reach of Section 66-7-325(A) when it deviated from the language of the statute in its analysis. The first such deviation was when the Court articulated the issue that it would discuss: “we must decide whether Deputy Francisco could have been affected by Defendant’s turn within the meaning of Section 66-7-325(A).” Hubble, No. 26,452, slip. op. at 2 (emphasis added). Later, the Court reasoned, “[w]e do not understand how Deputy Francisco’s operation of his vehicle was affected in any normal sense of this word by a right turn that occurred after he was well clear of the intersection.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). Finally, the Court stated, “[t]he State has not directed our attention to any evidence that Deputy Francisco believed that Defendant’s right turn itself presented a potential hazard to him. . . .” Id. (emphasis added).

            {20} Given our interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) and its underlying policy, it is clear that the Court of Appeals required a greater show of effect than the statute contemplates. The State was not required to prove that Deputy Francisco could have been affected, that he was affected, or that Defendant’s turn presented a potential hazard; the statute only requires that the surrounding facts establish that there was a reasonable possibility that he may have been affected. To require an actual effect or a potential hazard would undermine the policy behind driving safety by depriving non-signaling drivers of visual cues and ample decision-making time in their interactions with drivers who intend to change directions. We therefore conclude that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and affirm Defendant’s turn signal violation conviction. We now turn our discussion to reasonable suspicion.

            C. Mistakes of Fact and Law and Reasonable Suspicion

            {21} Defendant argues that the traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion because Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he concluded that Defendant violated the traffic code. As we have already discussed, we agree with the district court that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and therefore Deputy Francisco did not make a mistake of any kind. However, in order to clarify the law regarding reasonable suspicion, we take this opportunity to discuss mistakes of law and mistakes of fact and how they interact with reasonable suspicion.

            {22} A mistake of law is a “mistake about the legal effect of a known fact or situation,” whereas a mistake of fact is a “mistake about a fact that is material to a transaction; any mistake other than a mistake of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1023. Although mistakes of law and fact are more frequently encountered in the context of criminal defenses, some jurisdictions have incorporated these concepts into their rules regarding reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Valadez-Valadez, 525 F.3d 987, 991 (10th Cir.2008) (“[F]ailure to understand the plain and unambiguous law . . . is not objectively reasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Coplin, 463 F.3d 96, 101 (1st Cir.

    [206 P.3d 586]

    2006) (“Stops premised on a mistake of law, even a reasonable, good-faith mistake, are generally held to be unconstitutional.”); United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1276 (11th Cir.2003) (reasoning that, while an officer’s mistake of fact may provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion, an officer’s mistake of law cannot); People v. Ramirez, 140 Cal.App.4th 849, 44 Cal. Rptr.3d 813, 816 (2006) (“[A] suspicion founded on a mistake of law cannot constitute the reasonable basis required for a lawful traffic stop.”)

            1. State v. Anaya

            {23} Reasonable suspicion in New Mexico is analyzed with the use of an objective test. In State v. Anaya, our Court of Appeals held that “conduct premised totally on a mistake of law cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop; but if the facts articulated by the officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be upheld.” Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 15, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163.

            {24} The facts in Anaya are similar to the instant case. The defendant in Anaya was observed to be weaving within his lane of traffic and was later stopped by a police officer after he failed to utilize his turn signal. Id. ¶ 2. After approaching the car and observing signs of intoxication, the officer arrested the defendant for DWI. Id. The defendant moved to suppress the DWI evidence on the basis that the initial stop was invalid because it was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. ¶ 3. At the suppression hearing, the officer testified that he did not observe any other cars in the area at the time of the stop and that he understood that the turn signal statute required the use of a turn signal in all circumstances. Id. Additionally, the officer did not testify that he was affected by the defendant’s right turn. Id. The district court found that the defendant’s traffic stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion and granted the motion to suppress the DWI evidence. Id. ¶ 4.

            {25} In affirming the district court’s decision to suppress the evidence, the Anaya Court found that, although “there could be cases in which the officer’s vehicle could be considered affected traffic, depending on the evidence presented[,] . . . the facts as articulated by the officer do not support violation of the turn signal law.” Id. ¶ 19. The Court also stated that “[f]ailure to signal is not a per se traffic violation, despite [the] officer’s good-faith understanding to the contrary,” and also classified the officer’s mistake as a mistake of law. Id. ¶ 17. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, the Court agreed with the district court’s finding that “the officer’s vehicle was not traffic that could be affected by [the][d]efendant’s failure to signal.” Id. ¶ 19.

            2. Anaya Does Not Conflict With Our Objective Reasonable Suspicion Test

            {26} The State argues that Anaya conflicts with our existing caselaw that has consistently applied an objective approach to analyzing reasonable suspicion. We disagree.

            {27} In its answer brief, the State asserted that “[t]he Anaya Court incorrectly states that New Mexico caselaw holds that conduct premised totally on a mistake of law cannot create the reasonable suspicion needed to make a traffic stop.” However, in making this assertion, the State ignored the second part of Anaya’s holding: “but if the facts articulated by the officer support reasonable suspicion on another basis, the stop can be upheld.” Id. ¶ 15. This second part is critical because it establishes that a court’s analysis has not been completed once an officer’s conduct has been categorized as a mistake of law—courts will still analyze the facts surrounding the officer’s decision in order to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion on another basis. In essence, the second part of the Anaya proposition is our objective test for reasonable suspicion.

            {28} Even with the “mistake of law” language of the first part of Anaya proposition, our objective test set forth in Brennan and Muñoz remains unaffected because it does not hinge on a court’s classification of an officer’s mistake as either a mistake of law or a mistake of fact. See Brennan, 1998-NMCA-176, ¶ 10, 126 N.M. 389, 970 P.2d 161 (“[T]he question is whether there

    [206 P.3d 587]

    were facts available to [the officer] that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe the stop was appropriate.”); Muñoz, 1998-NMCA-140, ¶ 9, 125 N.M. 765, 965 P.2d 349 (“The test [for reasonable suspicion] is an objective one. The subjective belief of the officer does not in itself affect the validity of the stop; it is the evidence known to the officer that counts. . . .”). In other words, it is not fatal in terms of reasonable suspicion if an officer makes a mistake of law when he conducts a traffic stop; courts will still look objectively to the totality of the circumstances surrounding the officer’s decision to conduct the traffic stop in order to determine if he or she had reasonable suspicion.

            {29} This was the Court of Appeals’ process in Anaya. It determined that the officer in that case made a mistake of law because he believed that the turn signal statute required drivers to engage their turn signal at all times, no matter if there was other traffic that may have been affected or not. Anaya, 2008-NMCA-020, ¶ 17, 143 N.M. 431, 176 P.3d 1163. However, the inquiry did not end with this determination. The Court of Appeals still had to determine, despite the officer’s misunderstanding of the law, if there were other facts surrounding the officer’s decision to conduct the traffic stop that could provide the objective grounds for reasonable suspicion. Id. (“[T]here [were] no other facts or testimony . . . to support reasonable suspicion on other grounds.”). The Court further held that “[i]t cannot be objectively reasonable to stop a vehicle when there are no facts to support the inference that a law has been violated.” Id. ¶ 20 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court analyzed the facts surrounding the officer’s decision and did not merely conclude that there was no reasonable suspicion upon its determination that the officer had made a mistake of law.

            3. This is Not a Mistake of Law Case

            {30} In an attempt to apply the proposition set forth in Anaya, Defendant argues that Deputy Francisco made a mistake of law when he conducted the traffic stop of Defendant based on a perceived violation of the turn signal statute and that this mistake was the sole basis for the stop. We disagree.

            {31} Primarily, as discussed above, we hold that Defendant violated the turn signal statute and thus, Deputy Francisco did not make a mistake either of fact or of law when he conducted the traffic stop of Defendant. Thus, the mistake of law portion of the Anaya proposition does not apply. Also, unlike the officer in Anaya, who testified that he “understood Section 66-7-325 to require the use of a turn signal in all circumstances,” id. ¶ 3, there is no evidence in the record before us that Deputy Francisco had any such misunderstanding of the breadth of Section 66-7-325(A).

            {32} Finally, even if Deputy Francisco was mistaken when he believed that Defendant had violated the turn signal statute, such a mistake would be a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law. Deputy Francisco’s determinations—that he, while driving his vehicle on the highway, was “traffic,” and that he “may [have been] affected” by Defendant’s turn-concerned “fact[s] that [were] material to [the] transaction.” See Black’s Law Dictionary 1023. Deputy Francisco made no mistake about the applicable rules of law relating to the mandatory use of turn signal. Instead, he had to determine whether certain facts—the relative positions of the vehicles and their direction of travel—constituted a scenario where he may have been affected by Defendant’s movement. Thus, any mistakes regarding these factual judgments would be classified as mistakes of fact and not mistakes of law.

            4. Reasonable Suspicion Analysis

            {33} Given our interpretation of Section 66-7-325(A) and our holding that Defendant violated the statute, we now address the reasonable suspicion inquiry to the facts of this case.

            {34} Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that Deputy Francisco had reasonable suspicion to stop Defendant. Deputy Francisco testified that as he passed through the intersection, he observed Defendant approach the same intersection perpendicularly and come to a stop. Deputy Francisco observed that Defendant did not have his turn signal engaged at that time. Deputy Francisco further testified that Defendant never, at any time, had his turn signal engaged as Deputy

    [206 P.3d 588]

    Francisco drove through the intersection and pulled over to the side of the road.

            {35} Looking at the “totality of the circumstances” and through an objective lens, we hold that Deputy Francisco had a “particularized suspicion . . . that [Defendant] [was] breaking, or [had] broken[] the law.” See Jason L., 2000-NMSC-018, ¶ 20, 129 N.M. 119, 2 P.3d 856. The “specific articulable” facts that Deputy Francisco observed would lead a reasonable officer to believe that Defendant had violated the turn signal statute and they created the objective basis for Deputy Francisco’s reasonable suspicion. Thus, Deputy Francisco’s traffic stop of Defendant was based upon reasonable suspicion.

            III. CONCLUSION

            {36} We hold that Defendant violated Section 66-7-325(A) and that Deputy Francisco had reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop of Defendant. The district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress and his convictions are hereby affirmed.

            {37} IT IS SO ORDERED.

            WE CONCUR: EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Chief Justice, PETRA JIMENEZ MAES, RICHARD C. BOSSON, and CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justices.