Category: Crime

  • Ironclad Alibi Causes Dismissal

    Robbery of Cannabis Facility | Santa Fe New Mexican Article by Phaedra Haywood

    According to court records, Jose Nava, one of the other men whose names were mentioned in connection with the case faced charges almost identical to Barela’s until September 21. The the district attorney dismissed them. A man whom Prentice identified as someone who had placed himself at the crime scene and identified the others in 2015 does not appear to have been charged in the case.

    Nava’s attorney, Stephen Aarons, said Monday the charges against Nava were dismissed after the informant who placed Nava at the scene recanted. Aarons also said Nava had a “pretty ironclad alibi” that he was at work when the robbery happened.

  • State v. Saavedra (NM App 2017)

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

    No. 36,225

    STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Appellee,
    v.
    CINDERELLA SAAVEDRA, Defendant-Appellant.

    APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SAN MIGUEL COUNTY
    Gerald E. Baca
    , District Judge

    Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General Santa Fe, NM for Appellee

    Aarons Law Firm PC Stephen D. Aarons Santa Fe, NM for Appellant

    MEMORANDUM OPINION

    HANISEE, Judge.

    Page 2

    {1} Defendant appeals from her conviction of aggravated battery without great bodily harm. We previously issued a notice of proposed summary disposition in which we proposed to affirm. Defendant has filed a memorandum in opposition thereto. After due consideration, we remain unpersuaded.

    {2} In her memorandum in opposition, Defendant reiterates her position that her testimony that she hit the victim “out of panic” was sufficient to warrant an instruction on simple battery as a lesser included offense because it supported her theory that she did so without any intent to injure the victim. [MIO 2] Defendant argues that her testimony established that she was having a panic attack, citing the fact that, in closing argument, the prosecutor characterized her testimony as having said that she was having a panic attack. [Id.] However, the memorandum in opposition acknowledges that Defendant’s exact words were that she hit the victim over the face and head “out of panic” and does not challenge our observation that prior to doing so and breaking the pool stick in half in the process, Defendant had become enraged, had pushed the victim to the ground, had armed herself with the pool stick after the two had been separated, had instigated the victim to come out of her room again, and had warned the victim not to approach her. [Id.; RP 195-97] Regardless of the prosecutor’s subsequent characterization of Defendant’s testimony, we remain unpersuaded that her isolated statement that she acted “out of panic[,]” without more, “tend[ed] to

    Page 3

    establish that [simple battery was] the highest degree of crime committed.” State v. Pettigrew, 1993-NMCA-095, ¶ 5, 116 N.M. 135, 860 P.2d 777. Contrary to Defendant’s assertion, our notice of proposed summary disposition did not state that “no reasonable jury could believe Defendant when she testified that she struck out of panic.” [MIO 5] Rather, we proposed to hold that her testimony, coupled with the other evidence presented at trial, was “inconsistent with a lack of intent to injure.” [CN 4] Defendant’s reliance on State v. Skippings, 2011-NMSC-021, 150 N.M. 216, 258 P.3d 1008, is misplaced. [MIO 5-6] In Skippings, the victim died after she and the defendant “became entangled, with [the v]ictim straddling [the d]efendant. [The d]efendant sought to extricate himself from [the v]ictim and forced her off of him, resulting in her landing on the asphalt roadway and cracking her skull.” Id. ¶ 6. Unlike the present case, there was no evidence in Skippings that the defendant had armed himself in advance with any type of weapon, and there was evidence in addition to the defendant’s testimony to suggest that he was merely trying to free himself from the victim. Id.

    {3} Defendant further cites State v. Seal, 1966-NMSC-123, 76 N.M. 461, 415 P.2d 845 (reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support conviction of simple battery), and State v. Hill, 2001-NMCA-094, 131 N.M. 195, 34 P.3d 139 (reviewing the denial of requested self defense, resisting, obstructing, or evading an officer, and

    Page 4

    entrapment instructions). [MIO 6] Neither one of these cases addresses the issue before us, and thus we fail to see how they support Defendant’s position.

    {4} Defendant further argues that our observation that her testimony was relevant to the issue of self-defense requires reversal. [MIO 7-8] Defendant cites a thirty-year-old out-of-state case dealing with imperfect self-defense as authority for the proposition that ” ‘one who truly believes that there is a need for self[-]defense cannot be said to act with intent to injure.’ ” [MIO 7] (quoting People v. McKelvy, 239 Cal. Rptr. 782 (1987)) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). However, the language relied upon by Defendant was dictum by a single judge, and Defendant fails to cite any authority demonstrating that it has been adopted in that jurisdiction or ours. [Id.] See In re Adoption of Doe, 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329 (stating that where a party cites no authority to support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists). As such, we remain unpersuaded.

    {5} Defendant further argues that the jury’s questions whether “[the battery] can be thoughtless and spur of the moment?” and “what constitutes purpose and intention to harm?” establish that reversal is in order. [MIO 3] At most, the first inquiry demonstrates that at least one juror questioned the essential element of specific intent, whereas the second inquiry merely demonstrates that at least one juror wished to receive additional definitions. As such, we hold that these questions do not establish

    Page 5

    that there was “some evidence tending to establish that [simple battery was] the highest degree of crime committed.” Pettigrew, 1993-NMCA-095, ¶ 5. For the same reason, we hereby deny Defendant’s motion to supplement the record proper with these jury questions.

    {6} Therefore, and for the reasons stated in our calendar notice, we affirm.

    {7} IT IS SO ORDERED.

    /s/_________
    J. MILES HANISEE, Judge

    WE CONCUR:

    /s/_________
    MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge

    /s/_________
    TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge

    This memorandum opinion was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date.

     

    [/column]

  • Index of Federal Cases

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    Stephen D Aarons is an attorney in 159 federal cases in the US District Court for the District of New Mexico.

    1:00-cr-00728-MV-1 Anthony Trujillo filed 05/26/00   closed 11/02/01
    1:00-cr-01392-JEC-4 Antoine Johnson filed 10/19/00   closed 11/05/02
    1:01-cr-00313-JAP-1 Jeffrey Lynn Dixon filed 03/13/01   closed 07/02/02
    1:01-cr-00867-JAP-4 Sofia Lopez filed 07/11/01   closed 03/06/03
    1:01-cr-01435-MV-1 Donald Ray Elliott filed 10/23/01   closed 07/11/02
    1:01-mj-00115-LFG-1 Jeffrey Lynn Dixon filed 02/23/01   closed 03/13/01
    1:01-mj-00428-DJS-1 Donald Ray Elliott filed 08/03/01   closed 10/23/01
    1:02-cr-00541-LH-1 Harold Gray filed 04/10/02   closed 04/08/03
    1:02-cr-02043-BB-8 Eddie Esquibel filed 11/15/02   closed 06/30/03
    1:03-cr-00777-BB-1 Calvin D Sinks filed 04/23/03   closed 04/20/05
    1:03-cr-00884-RHS-1 Reginald Melvin Whitehead filed 05/14/03   closed 12/17/03
    1:03-cr-01015-JEC-1 Melvin Devon Cooley filed 05/29/03   closed 03/03/04
    1:03-cr-01454-MV-1 Edmund Poblano filed 08/01/03   closed 03/03/04
    1:03-cr-02274-JB-1 John Gould filed 11/14/03   closed 05/06/09
    1:03-mj-00142-RLP-1 Jorge Juarez filed 03/17/03   closed 07/11/03
    1:04-cr-00157-JAP-1 John A Garcia filed 01/27/04   closed 10/14/05
    1:04-cr-00159-MV-2 Michael T Martin filed 01/27/04   closed 01/10/06
    1:04-cr-00561-LH-2 Jose Rivera-Morales filed 03/23/04   closed 12/21/06
    1:04-cr-01211-WJ-3 Ronnell Michael Duvall filed 06/23/04
    1:04-mj-00390-RLP-3 Ronnell Michael Duvall filed 06/11/04   closed 06/24/04
    1:05-cr-00263-JCH-1 Kenneth Manzanares filed 02/08/05   closed 09/21/07
    1:05-cr-01014-JCH-2 Major Sheffield filed 05/10/05   closed 01/06/06
    1:05-cr-01604-JB-1 Arthur Ben Peshlakai filed 07/27/05   closed 12/18/07
    1:05-cr-01849-JCH-15 Matthew Hotthan filed 08/24/05   closed 07/29/08
    1:05-cr-02159-MV-1 Jeremy Baldonado filed 09/27/05   closed 08/23/07
    1:05-cv-00639-JAP-WPL Dixon v. USA filed 06/02/05   closed 07/19/05
    1:05-cv-00640-JAP-LFG Lopez v. USA filed 06/01/05   closed 07/12/05
    1:05-mj-00240-DJS-2 Major Sheffield filed 04/21/05   closed 05/11/05
    1:05-mj-00378-RWI-1 Arthur Ben Peshlakai filed 06/22/05   closed 07/28/05
    1:06-cr-01533-JCH-1 William L Jones filed 07/11/06   closed 08/17/07
    1:06-cr-01984-JB-1 Rosemarie Barbour filed 09/13/06   closed 02/06/07
    1:06-cr-02076-MCA-2 Joseph Charles Marion, Jr filed 09/27/06   closed 08/10/07
    1:06-cr-02499-JCH-1 William L Jones filed 12/05/06   closed 08/17/07
    1:06-cr-02611-JB-2 Tan Dau Vu filed 12/21/06   closed 01/02/08
    1:06-mj-00454-DJS-2 Joseph Charles Marion, Jr filed 09/07/06   closed 09/29/06
    1:06-mj-00585-RLP-2 Tan Dau Vu filed 12/06/06   closed 12/22/06
    1:07-cr-00486-JEC-1 Suezanna Bonesteel filed 03/15/07   closed 11/14/07
    1:07-cr-00931-LFG-1 Jessica Lynn Quintana filed 05/15/07   closed 12/20/07
    1:07-cr-01760-WJ-1 Rick E Reichard filed 08/23/07   closed 04/02/08
    1:07-mj-00347-RHS-1 Suezanna Bonesteel filed 02/14/07   closed 02/21/07
    1:07-mj-01565-LFG-1 Rick E Reichard filed 08/07/07   closed 08/24/07
    1:07-mj-02277-RHS-1 Oscar Cruz-Lopez filed 12/03/07   closed 01/29/08
    1:08-cr-00159-MCA-1 Oscar Cruz-Lopez filed 01/29/08   closed 10/07/08
    1:08-cr-00822-WJ-3 Richard Tafoya filed 04/22/08   closed 03/16/10
    1:08-cr-01546-JAP-1 Joseph Lawrence Trujillo filed 07/08/08   closed 10/19/09
    1:08-cr-01670-MV-6 Anthony Parras filed 07/22/08   closed 06/03/10
    1:08-cr-01970-JCH-1 Timothy Bland filed 08/26/08   closed 08/25/11
    1:08-cr-02337-JAP-1 Noah Kuranga filed 10/08/08   closed 01/13/10
    1:08-cr-02707-WDS-1 Lowena D Towles filed 11/18/08   closed 04/29/09
    1:08-cr-02830-JCH-1 Theodore Largo filed 12/03/08   closed 07/29/10
    1:08-cv-00893-BB-LFG Rowley v. City of Albuquerque et al filed 10/01/08   closed 01/20/09
    1:08-mj-02580-LFG-1 Lowena D Towles filed 10/30/08   closed 11/18/08
    1:08-mj-02606-LFG-1 Theodore Largo filed 11/04/08   closed 12/03/08
    1:09-cr-00594-JEC-1 Yves Dion filed 03/11/09   closed 10/06/10
    1:09-cr-00862-WJ-2 Joseph A Marino filed 04/09/09   closed 11/06/09
    1:09-cr-01034-JB-1 Leroy Perea filed 04/22/09   closed 06/25/10
    1:09-cr-01047-JCH-3 Terri Ann Telles filed 04/22/09   closed 06/30/10
    1:09-cr-02050-JAP-1 Moses E Maestas filed 07/22/09   closed 10/06/10
    1:09-mj-00700-RHS-1 Joseph A Marino filed 03/16/09   closed 04/09/09
    1:09-mj-01834-DJS-1 Moses E Maestas filed 06/30/09   closed 07/22/09
    1:09-mj-02770-LFG-3 Ronald Lamont Peterson, Jr. filed 09/22/09   closed 03/24/10
    1:10-cr-00736-MCA-3 Ronald Lamont Peterson, Jr. filed 03/24/10   closed 07/06/10
    1:10-cr-00754-JCH-1 Jose L. Cortazar filed 03/24/10   closed 08/23/11
    1:10-cr-00759-JB-1 Wesley Rogers filed 03/24/10   closed 03/21/11
    1:10-cr-00989-JEC-2 Cristian Sepulveda Cabrera filed 04/14/10   closed 03/23/11
    1:10-cr-01358-MCA-1 Raymond Joseph Martin filed 05/11/10   closed 05/17/11
    1:10-cr-01759-JEC-2 David Gee filed 06/10/10   closed 11/02/10
    1:10-cr-03354-WJ-2 Oscar Eduardo Gonzalez-Leon filed 12/15/10   closed 06/18/12
    1:10-cv-00709-JB-LFG A.L.A. et al v. The Board of Education of the Las Vegas City Schools et al filed 07/28/10   closed 11/15/11
    1:10-cv-01182-WJ-GBW Rowley v. Morant et al filed 12/10/10   closed 12/19/14
    1:10-mj-00984-DJS-1 Raymond Joseph Martin filed 04/06/10   closed 05/11/10
    1:10-mj-02998-RHS-2 Oscar Eduardo Gonzalez-Leon filed 11/18/10   closed 01/11/11
    1:11-cr-00886-JCH-1 Demetria Luisa Brown filed 04/13/11   closed 02/23/12
    1:11-cr-02025-JCH-1 Donnie Neil Hobbs filed 07/28/11   closed 01/15/14
    1:11-cr-02794-LH-1 Teresa Ann Lucero filed 10/27/11   closed 10/27/11
    1:11-cr-03101-LH-1 Michael Aguirre filed 12/14/11   closed 08/28/12
    1:11-mj-00429-DJS-4 Abel Carrillo Nevarez filed 02/25/11   closed 03/02/11
    1:11-mj-01419-LFG-1 Mark Edwards Jacobs filed 05/31/11   closed 06/02/11
    1:11-mj-01698-KBM-1 Donnie Neil Hobbs filed 06/29/11   closed 07/28/11
    1:11-mj-02074-WDS-2 Llewellyn Dee Benally filed 08/12/11   closed 08/17/11
    1:12-cr-00533-LH-1 Lawrence Munoz filed 03/13/12   closed 01/15/13
    1:12-cr-00857-JAP-1 Veronica Villela-Romero filed 04/12/12   closed 05/16/12
    1:12-cr-01062-MV-1 Victor Javier Hernandez filed 05/08/12   closed 09/13/12
    1:12-cr-01099-JEC-1 Elizabeth Talamantes filed 05/11/12   closed 06/20/12
    1:12-cr-01182-JB-1 Mario Alberto Munoz-Chavez filed 05/21/12   closed 07/02/12
    1:12-cr-01401-MCA-1 Torvold Kellywood filed 06/12/12   closed 02/14/13
    1:12-cr-01907-WJ-1 Charles Gallegos filed 08/07/12   closed 11/05/13
    1:12-cr-01916-WJ-1 Willie Bachicha filed 08/07/12   closed 03/25/13
    1:12-cr-02222-WJ-1 Antonio Gutierrez filed 09/05/12   closed 07/08/14
    1:12-cr-02369-MV-1 Desiree Louise Sowell filed 09/25/12   closed 05/13/14
    1:12-cr-02375-JB-1 Uriel J Esquivel filed 09/25/12   closed 05/21/14
    1:12-cr-02680-JAP-1 Deluvino Elias Salazar filed 10/23/12   closed 03/20/14
    1:12-cr-03182-JB-6 Manuel Valencia filed 12/12/12   closed 04/21/15
    1:12-cr-03289-JCH-2 Marcial Hurtado-Fonseca filed 12/19/12   closed 06/12/13
    1:12-mj-00501-LFG-1 Veronica Villela-Romero filed 03/07/12   closed 04/12/12
    1:12-mj-00502-LFG-1 Elizabeth Talamantes filed 03/07/12   closed 05/11/12
    1:12-mj-00748-LFG-1 Mario Alberto Munoz-Chavez filed 03/29/12   closed 05/21/12
    1:12-mj-00749-LFG-1 Victor Javier Hernandez filed 03/29/12   closed 05/08/12
    1:12-mj-02039-LFG-1 Uriel J Esquivel filed 08/27/12   closed 09/25/12
    1:12-mj-02473-KBM-1 Deluvino Elias Salazar filed 10/09/12   closed 10/24/12
    1:12-mj-03078-RHS-2 Marcial Hurtado-Fonseca filed 12/07/12   closed 12/21/12
    1:12-mr-00054-WDS-1 *SEALED* Antonio Carroll filed 01/18/12
    1:13-cr-00306-JAP-2 Alex Baena-Aguilar filed 02/06/13   closed 09/26/13
    1:13-cr-00559-JB-2 Nestor Valdez filed 02/27/13   closed 10/04/13
    1:13-cr-01372-MCA-3 Alfredo Andrade filed 04/24/13   closed 06/12/14
    1:13-cr-02028-JAP-1 Angel LNU filed 06/12/13   closed 10/10/14
    1:13-cr-02226-JB-1 Lee Baca filed 06/26/13   closed 02/04/14
    1:13-cr-02858-JB-1 David Mendez-Medina filed 08/27/13   closed 08/27/13
    1:13-mj-00149-LFG-2 Alex Baena-Aguilar filed 01/18/13   closed 02/06/13
    1:13-mj-02694-KBM-1 Carmen Melendez-Enriquez filed 08/22/13   closed 11/18/13
    1:15-cr-00214-MV-1 Gerald James Viarrial filed 01/21/15   closed 01/26/17
    1:15-cr-00533-JB-1 Marcos A Martinez filed 02/18/15   closed 02/14/17
    1:15-cr-04076-WJ-1 Rashad Travon Woods filed 11/17/15   closed 06/15/16
    1:15-cv-01003-JB-CG Valencia v. United States of America filed 11/04/15   closed 09/30/16
    1:15-mj-00226-KBM-1 Marcos A Martinez filed 01/26/15   closed 02/20/15
    1:17-cr-01103-MV-1 Dina Gonzalez-Marquez filed 04/26/17
    1:17-cr-01362-WJ-1 Uchenna Nlemchi filed 05/24/17
    1:91-cv-00782-ELM USA v. Corvette Chevrolet filed 08/05/91   closed 02/25/92
    1:92-cr-00174-SEC-1 Jason J Jones filed 04/09/92   closed 10/09/92
    1:94-cv-00001-SEC-WD Flattley v. Johnson filed 01/03/94   closed 04/20/94
    1:99-cr-00008-MV-2 Johannah Whitman filed 01/07/99   closed 08/25/99
    1:99-cr-00770-MV-1 Hector Rogelio Valles-Rodriguez filed 07/08/99   closed 06/08/00
    2:06-cr-00424-JCH-2 Nicholas Jay Hopkins filed 02/27/06   closed 06/02/06
    2:09-cr-03663-MV-1 Luis Manuel Montoya filed 12/23/09   closed 03/31/10
    2:10-cr-01566-WJ-15 Edwin Baltazar Sanchez filed 05/26/10   closed 06/29/11
    2:10-cr-03093-JB-15 Mario David Di Franco filed 11/10/10   closed 06/09/11
    2:11-mj-02690-ACT-1 Samuel Valles-Ruiz filed 11/16/11   closed 01/24/12
    2:12-cr-00130-MV-1 Samuel Valles-Ruiz filed 01/24/12   closed 08/16/12
    2:12-cr-02014-JAP-1 Mario Kanakoqui Isordia filed 08/15/12   closed 11/29/12
    2:12-mj-01116-CG-1 Mario Kanakoqui Isordia filed 05/09/12   closed 08/15/12
    2:13-cr-01504-JCH-1 Maria Mercedes Aguilar-Urquilla filed 05/07/13   closed 06/06/13
    2:13-cr-01588-ABJ-1 David Gallegos-Correa filed 05/09/13   closed 06/25/13
    2:13-cr-01589-WJ-1 Jesus Calderon-Saenz filed 05/09/13   closed 06/17/13
    2:13-cr-01590-MV-1 Alvaro Salazar-Rivera filed 05/09/13   closed 06/25/13
    2:13-cr-02711-JB-1 David Mendez-Medina filed 08/14/13   closed 10/08/13
    2:13-cr-04004-RB-1 Mario Orlando Jude Serrano filed 12/11/13   closed 11/09/15
    2:13-cr-04037-MCA-1 Fausto Abel Jimenez-Armendariz filed 12/17/13   closed 02/18/14
    2:13-cr-04110-MCA-1 Miguel Angel Rivera-De La Trinidad filed 12/26/13   closed 02/27/14
    2:13-cr-04111-MV-1 Roberto Brito-Molina filed 12/26/13   closed 02/06/14
    2:13-mj-00960-WDS-1 David Gallegos-Correa filed 03/26/13   closed 05/09/13
    2:13-mj-00961-WDS-1 Jesus Calderon-Saenz filed 03/26/13   closed 05/09/13
    2:13-mj-01303-RHS-1 Alvaro Salazar-Rivera filed 04/18/13   closed 05/09/13
    2:13-mj-01304-RHS-1 Maria Mercedes Aguilar-Urquilla filed 04/18/13   closed 05/07/13
    2:13-mj-02357-ACT-1 David Mendez-Medina filed 07/15/13   closed 08/14/13
    2:13-mj-03336-LFG-1 Fausto Abel Jimenez-Armendariz filed 10/23/13   closed 12/17/13
    2:13-mj-03715-KBM-1 Miguel Angel Rivera-De La Trinidad filed 12/01/13   closed 12/26/13
    2:13-mj-03716-KBM-1 Roberto Brito-Molina filed 12/01/13   closed 12/26/13
    2:14-cr-00832-KG-2 Martin Llantada filed 03/19/14   closed 05/12/15
    2:17-cr-01037-RB-1 Yi Lee filed 04/19/17
    2:17-cr-01923-RB-2 Manuel Pavon-Rodriguez filed 07/19/17
    5:12-cr-03108-MV-1 Roger Baeza filed 12/05/12   closed 02/06/14
    5:12-mj-02672-WDS-1 Roger Baeza filed 10/30/12   closed 12/11/12
    6:05-cv-00612-MV-KBM Elliott v. USA filed 06/01/05   closed 08/08/05
    6:08-cv-00954-WJ-RHS Arellano v. Board of Education of Las Vegas Public Schools filed 10/16/08   closed 06/12/09
    6:10-cv-01086-BB-GBW Burciaga-Segura et al v. The Board of Education of the Las Vegas City Schools et al filed 11/15/10   closed 05/26/11
    6:93-cr-00202-SEC-1 Jose Luis Barron-Lopez filed 04/22/93   closed 01/21/94
    6:93-cv-01467-PJK San Ildefonso v. Ridlon, et al filed 12/14/93   closed 04/30/97
    6:95-cv-01062-MV-DJS Stock v. Grantham, et al filed 09/19/95   closed 10/26/95
    6:95-cv-01127-SEC-WD Ohls v. USA filed 09/22/95   closed 05/14/96

    [/column]

  • Valencia v. United States (DNM 2016)

    MANUEL VALENCIA, Petitioner,
    v.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

    No. CIV 15-1003 JB/CG
    No. CR 12-3182 JB

    UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO

    MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

    THIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed June 8, 2016 (CIV Doc. 13)(“PFRD”). In the PFRD, the Honorable Carmen E. Garza, United States Magistrate Judge, concludes that Petitioner Manuel Valencia fails to demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his rights under the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States of America, and recommends that the Court dismiss his Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, November 4, 2015 (CIV Doc. 1)(“Petition”), with prejudice.1

    Judge Garza notified the parties that written objections to the PFRD were due within fourteen days. See PFRD at 19. Valencia filed Petitioner’s Objections to Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed June 27, 2016 (CIV Doc. 14)(“Objections”), and a Supplement to Petitioner’s Objections to Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed June 29, 2016 (CIV Doc 15). After a de novo review of the record and the PFRD, the Court adopts Judge

    Page 2

    Garza’s PFRD.

    FACTUAL BACKGROUND

    Valencia is incarcerated at the Santa Fe County Correctional Facility in Santa Fe, New Mexico. See Petition at 2. On January 20, 2015, Valencia pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute cocaine pursuant to a plea agreement. See Plea Agreement, filed January 20, 2015 (CR Doc. 742). On April 21, 2015, Valencia was sentenced to twenty-seven months imprisonment. See Petition at 5.

    Valencia requests habeas review of his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, asking the Court to resentence him because his attorney, Ashli Summer McKeivier, was constitutionally ineffective. See Pretrial Memorandum, filed January 2, 2016 (CIV Doc. 6). The Court referred this matter to Judge Garza to conduct analysis, and to make findings of fact and recommend a disposition. See Order Referring Case, filed November 5, 2015 (CIV Doc. 2). Judge Garza concluded that the Court should dismiss Valencia’s claim with prejudice, because Valencia fails to demonstrate that he was denied effective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.

    1. Objections.

    Pursuant to rule 8 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts, a district judge may, under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), refer a pretrial dispositive motion to a Magistrate Judge for proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition. Within fourteen days of being served, a party may file objections to this recommendation. See Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts. A party may respond to another party’s objections within fourteen days of being served with a copy; the

    Page 3

    rule does not provide for a reply. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).2

    When resolving objections to a Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, the district judge must make a de novo determination regarding any part of the recommendation to which a party has properly objected. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Filing objections that address the primary issues in the case “advances the interests that underlie the Magistrate’s Act,[3] including judicial efficiency.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., With Bldgs., Appurtenances, Improvements, and Contents, 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996)(“One Parcel“). Objections must be timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review. One Parcel, 73 F.3d at 1060. Additionally, issues “raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendation are deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996). See United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001)(“In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s report are deemed waived.”).

    In this case, Valencia requests habeas review of his conviction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not (i) provide Valencia with a hard copy of his Presentence Report; (ii) seek a downward departure pursuant to United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.”) § 5K2.12 for coercion or duress; (iii) object to the Presentence Report referring to Valencia as a “distributor” of cocaine rather than a “courier,” in support of a minor or minimal role adjustment; (iv) request a 2-level reduction for safety valve pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 5C1.2, 2D1.1(17); (v) argue that the quality

    Page 4

    issues with the cocaine served as a mitigating factor pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1; (vi) request a “split sentence,” with home confinement; (vii) ask the Court to include a recommendation for a nearby Federal Correctional Institution (“FCI”) including FCI Phoenix; (viii) ask the Court to recommend that the Valencia participate in the Bureau of Prisons’ Residential Drug Abuse Program (“RDAP”); (ix) “remind” the Court that he complied with his conditions of release; (x) tell the Court that he voluntarily forfeited his right to his motorcycle; (xi) object to the fine amount; and (xii) present the Court with family hardships and character letters submitted on Valencia’s behalf. See Pretrial Memorandum, filed January 2, 2016 (CIV Doc. 6).

    After considering all of the evidence in the record, Judge Garza determined that Valencia had not demonstrated that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel. See PFRD at 19. Accordingly, Judge Garza recommends that the Court dismiss all of Valencia’s claims for habeas relief with prejudice. See PFRD at 19.

    Valencia has now filed Objections and Supplemental Objections. In these Objections, Valencia reiterates all of the points he previously made. In addition, Valencia provides further facts regarding his attorney’s decision not to request a safety valve reduction for Valencia. See Supplemental Objections at 2. Valencia suggests that this new evidence indicates that his attorney’s decision was neither a strategic decision nor a reasonable decision. See Supplemental Objections at 2. Additionally, Valencia raises, for the first time, the argument that his attorney failed to advise him about his sentence. See Objections at 3, 8, 9, 15. Finally, Valencia requests the Court hold an evidentiary hearing based on the Motions, files, and records. See Objections at 1. The United States of America has not responded to Valencia’s Objections.

    Law Regarding Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

    In the PFRD, Judge Garza explains that, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel,

    Page 5

    Valencia must show that counsel’s performance was deficient because it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Valencia must satisfy both prongs outlined in Strickland v. United States to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687. Accordingly, the Court does not need to address both prongs if Valencia makes an insufficient showing on one. See United States v. Dowell, No. 10-1084, 388 Fed. Appx. 781, 783 (10th Cir. July 21, 2010)(unpublished)(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 697).

    In determining whether counsel’s performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, “counsel should be strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.” United States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299, 1307 (10th Cir. 2011)(internal citations and quotations omitted). Indeed, “[s]trategic or tactical decisions on the part of counsel are presumed correct, unless they were completely unreasonable, not merely wrong, so that they bear no relationship to a possible defense strategy.” United States v. Jordan, No. 13-3033, 516 Fed. Appx. 681, 682 (10th Cir. June 5, 2013)(unpublished)(citing Moore v. Marr, 254 F.3d 1235, 1239 (10th Cir. 2001)).

    To establish prejudice, Valencia must show “that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688. In connection with a plea agreement, Valencia must demonstrate that, “but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty but rather would have gone to trial.” Neef v. Heredia, No. 09-2200, 2010 WL 286562, at *2 (10th Cir. Jan. 26, 2010)(unpublished)(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56-59 (1985)). See United States v. Abston, No. 10-5091, 401 Fed. Appx. 357, 362

    Page 6

    (10th Cir. Nov. 5, 2010)(unpublished).

    ANALYSIS

    1. TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE.

    Upon review of the record, Judge Garza concludes that, while Valencia alleges his attorney failed to argue certain issues to the Court, Valencia does not demonstrate that his attorney’s choices were objectively unreasonable. In addition, Judge Garza concludes that Valencia did not argue that his attorney’s decisions prejudiced him. As a result, Judge Garza concludes that Valencia fails to demonstrate that counsel was ineffective.

    The Court agrees with Judge Garza’s analysis. In his Objections, Valencia continues to question his attorney’s decisions, but he does not provide any facts that suggest his attorney’s decisions prejudiced him. As Judge Garza stated in the PFRD, if Valencia alleges ineffective assistance of counsel in connection to a plea agreement, Valencia must demonstrate that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. See Miller v. Champion, 262 F.3d 1066, 1072 (10th Cir. 2001)(citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 52, 59). In both his Petition and his Objections, Valencia continues to maintain that his attorney failed to provide him with his Presentence Report and did not advocate positions with the Court as Valencia requests. Valencia does not allege, however, in his Petition or his Objections that his attorney’s decisions prejudiced him or that he would not have pled guilty. The Court therefore finds that Valencia has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was constitutionally deficient. Because Valencia reiterates the same arguments in his Objections, the Court will address only the safety-valve reduction argument, as Valencia argues that he has new evidence.

    Page 7

    1. TRIAL COUNSEL’S FAILURE TO REQUEST A SAFETY VALVE REDUCTION.

    Valencia continues to argue that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective because she did not advocate for a safety-valve reduction. See Objections at 5-6, 13-14. In his Supplemental Objections, Valencia alleges additional facts to support his claim. See Supplemental Objections at 1-2. Valencia’s additional factual allegations, however, do not convince this Court to overrule Judge Garza. Valencia provides the Court with what he states is the transcript of a voicemail that his attorney left Valencia, in which she says “I need to talk to you[,] we need to discuss this safety valve [proffer] so that we could get those two points[.]” See Supplemental Objections at 2. Valencia contends that this voicemail proves that his attorney did not make a strategic decision in failing to ask for the safety-valve reduction and that it was unreasonable not to ask the Court for the reduction. See Objections at 4. Even assuming this decision was objectively unreasonable, Valencia does not argue that the decision prejudiced him, or that he would have decided to plead not guilty and go to trial if he had known that his attorney was not seeking a safety-valve reduction. Because the test for ineffective assistance of counsel is a two part test and Valencia does not address the prejudice prong of the test, the Court also finds that Valencia has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that his attorney’s performance was constitutionally deficient.

    In addition to these new facts Valencia states that Judge Garza “fails to analyze whether Valencia is in fact eligible for a safety-valve reduction.” Objections at 13. However, in its Response in Opposition to Motion to Vacate Sentence, filed February 29, 2016 (CIV Doc. 11), the United States of America stated that Valencia was not eligible for the safety-valve reduction under U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2 because, Valencia was not truthful to the United States during his debriefing. See Response in Opposition to Motion to Vacate Sentence at 13-14. Judge Garza

    Page 8

    explained in the PFRD that, to qualify for the safety valve reduction, Valencia must “truthfully provide[ ] to the Government all information and evidence [Valencia] has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of conduct or of a common scheme or plan.” U.S.S.G § 5C1.2(a)(5). Based on the United States’ representations to his attorney that Valencia was not honest, the Court agrees with Judge Garza that his attorney made a reasonable strategic decision not to seek a safety valve reduction. Because the strategy was reasonable under the circumstances and because Valencia does not allege prejudice, the Court agrees that Valencia has not shown that his attorney was ineffective.

    1. TRIAL COUNSEL’S SENTENCE ESTIMATION.

    In his Objections, Valencia alleges for the first time that his attorney assured him that he would receive probation in this case if he pled guilty. See Objections at 3, 8, 9, 15. Claims that Valencia did not raise before the Magistrate Judge are deemed waived. Garfinkle v. United States, 261 F.3d at 1031. The Court will therefore not address this argument.

    1. EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

    Finally, Valencia asks that the Court hold a hearing on the Petition. See Objections at 1, 19. Judge Garza concluded that “the pleadings, files, and records conclusively show that Valencia is not entitled to any relief,” and therefore Judge Garza determined that she did not need to hold a hearing. PFRD at 19. A court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a § 2255 petition unless the motions, files, and records conclusively show that the prisoner is not entitled to any relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). The Court also finds that the existing record clearly shows that Valencia is not entitled to relief; consequently, the Court will not hold a hearing on the Petition.

    In sum, the Court concludes that Valencia has not met his burden to show that counsel’s

    Page 9

    performance prejudiced him. The Court thus agrees with Judge Garza’s conclusions that Valencia has not demonstrated that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the Court should dismiss the Petition with prejudice.

    The Court concludes that Judge Garza conducted the proper analysis and correctly concluded that the Court should dismiss Valencia’s claims with prejudice. The Court overrules Valencia’s objections.

    IT IS ORDERED that: (i) Judge Garza’s Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition, filed June 8, 2016 (CIV Doc. 13) are adopted; and (ii) the Court will dismiss Valencia’s Motion Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody, November 4, 2015 (Doc. 1), with prejudice.

    /s/_________
    UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

    Counsel:

    Stephen D. Aarons
    Aarons Law Firm, PC
    Santa Fe, New Mexico

    Attorney for the Petitioner

    Damon P. Martinez
    United States Attorney
    Shana B. Long
    Assistant United States Attorney
    United States Attorney’s Office
    Albuquerque, New Mexico

    Attorneys for the Respondent

    ——–

    Footnotes:

    1. Documents referenced as “CIV Doc. ___” are from No. CIV 15-1003 JB\CG. Documents referenced “CR Doc. ___” are from No. CR 12-3182 JB.
    2. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure may be applied to the extent that they are not inconsistent with any statutory provisions or the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings. See rule 12 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings for the United States District Courts.
    3. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39.

    ——–

  • Not Guilty Verdicts

    After severing counts two counts and the court dismissing a third count of criminal sexual contact of a minor, an Albuquerque jury deliberated for 40 minutes before acquitting Harold Potter of Las Vegas, Nevada, of the remaining two counts. Inconsistencies in the alleged victim’s testimony was a primary reason for the verdicts.

  • Taos County Jury Verdict

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    Defendant sent home after Jury returns verdict in Taos Murder Trial

    The prosecution did not object to Manual Leyba going home after the jury returned a verdict of involuntary manslaughter after the fatal stabbing in Penasco. A sentence hearing is scheduled for June 2016.

    [/column]

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    Peñasco man found guilty of involuntary manslaughter

    Laurie Celine Updated May 20, 2016

    Manuel Leyba of Peñasco was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter by a jury (May 19) in the Eighth Judicial District Court before Judge Jeff McElroy in Taos. The verdict was based on an incident that happened when Leyba allegedly stabbed his 22-year-old cousin, Alex Vigil, the night of June 19, 2015. Leyba, 31, was charged with second-degree murder.

    The events leading up to the murder began with a domestic altercation between Vigil and his girlfriend, Tysha Sandoval. Sandoval is the mother of James Leyba’s son, who is Manuel Leyba’s brother. Prosecutors Ron Olsen and David Thomas argued for second-degree murder, while Defense Attorney Stephen Aarons argued for innocence. The prosecutors and the defense attorney described the events leading up to the incident as intricate and complex family relations.

    The jury was instructed to make the decision by examining four possible outcomes: not guilty, self-defense, voluntary manslaughter and involuntary manslaughter, which it ultimately ruled on.

    Copyright Taos News, reprinted with permission

    [Editor’s Note: the four possible verdicts were: guilty of second degree murder, guilty of voluntary manslaughter, guilty of involuntary manslaughter and not guilty]

    [/column]

  • Aggravated DUI

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    5-star google

    After being charged for an aggravated DUI, I spent nearly 2 weeks researching and talking to different lawyers about my case. Came across Stephen Aarons and was immediately impressed with his style, methods, and ethics of work. With his easy going and likable attitude not only towards me as a client, but towards the DA, he was able to drop it to a simple deferred. After 1 year of checking off the legal requirements and good behavior, it will be dropped.

    [/column]

  • Rowley v. Morant (10th Cir 2015)

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    TRAVIS RYAN ROWLEY, Plaintiff – Appellant,
    v.
    ADP DETECTIVE KEVIN MORANT; ADP DETECTIVE MICHAEL FOX;
    ADP DETECTIVE FRANK FLORES; CHIEF OF POLICE RAY SCHULTZ;
    CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; JASON MORALES, Defendants – Appellees.

    No. 15-2010

    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS TENTH CIRCUIT

    November 25, 2015

    (D. New Mexico)
    (D.C. No. 1:10-CV-01182-WJ-GBW)

    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

    Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.

    Albuquerque detectives arrested Travis Rowley on murder charges. But after DNA evidence implicated another man, who admitted to the killings, the prosecution dropped all charges against Rowley. He then sued the detectives, alleging that they

    Page 2

    arrested him without probable cause based largely on an unlawful and false confession. The district court granted summary judgment against him.

    Rowley raises three claims of error on appeal: (1) the district court improperly decided that a pretrial ruling in his criminal case precluded his claim that his confession was coerced; (2) the district court improperly barred his Miranda claim as untimely; and (3) the district court improperly excluded testimony by his expert that the videotape of his confession was tampered with. We reject each claim.

    1. BACKGROUND

    On Sunday, December 2, 2007, Rowley arrived in Albuquerque with a group of traveling door-to-door magazine salespeople. Over the next three days, Rowley sold magazines throughout Albuquerque, including the neighborhood of Pung and Tak Yi. On December 4 the Yis were discovered murdered inside their home. An autopsy later revealed that they had probably been murdered on December 3.

    A neighbor of the Yis helped police create a composite sketch of a suspicious person who had come to his door on December 3. Local TV stations broadcast the image on December 5, and on December 6 a tip led Rio Rancho police to Rowley, who was selling magazines in Rio Rancho. Rowley told them that he had been selling throughout Albuquerque for the past three days. Without being prompted by any questions concerning the Yis, Rowley volunteered that he knew the officers were there to question him about the murder and that he had been in their neighborhood. Rio Rancho police

    Page 3

    shared this information and a photo of Rowley with the homicide division of the Albuquerque Police Department (APD).

    That afternoon and the next day, APD homicide detectives, including Kevin Morant, Michael Fox, and Frank Flores (Defendants), interrogated Rowley. As the questioning went on, Rowley’s statements grew increasingly inculpatory. Initially, Rowley denied any knowledge of the crime, saying he “was not there.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 41. After further interrogation, he stated that he witnessed his sales partner, Mike Lee, murder the Yis. Still later, he claimed to have struck Mr. Yi before his death. Rowley also offered nonpublic details about the crime scene that resembled what had been found. Defendants arrested Rowley on December 8, 2007. He was incarcerated for 16 months.

    In July 2008 a laboratory matched DNA taken from under Mr. Yi’s fingernail to one Clifton Bloomfield. Bloomfield, already incarcerated on separate murder charges, confessed to killing the Yis. The prosecution filed a nolle prosequi in the Rowley case on March 11, 2009. A month earlier the state criminal court had denied a motion by Rowley to suppress his statements to Defendants as involuntary.

    On December 10, 2010, Rowley filed a civil complaint against Defendants. He alleged that they lacked probable cause to arrest him, particularly because the strongest evidence against him—his confession—had been coerced and differed in many respects from the actual details of the crime. Rowley later sought to amend his complaint to allege that Defendants violated his Miranda rights, and he further alleged that police had

    Page 4

    doctored the recordings of his interrogation to remove the evidence of the Miranda violation.

    The district court granted summary judgment to Defendants. The court ruled that the state court’s earlier decision to admit Rowley’s confession into evidence precluded Rowley from arguing that his confession was coerced. The court also rejected as untimely Rowley’s request to allege a Miranda violation and excluded purportedly expert evidence proffered by Rowley to show the alleged doctoring of the interrogation recordings.

    1. DISCUSSION
    2. Coercion/Issue Preclusion

    In general, the doctrine of issue preclusion promotes judicial economy by precluding parties from relitigating an issue that they have already litigated unsuccessfully. But the particular rules governing the applicability of issue preclusion may vary somewhat from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Under the full-faith-and-credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, federal courts give a state-court ruling the preclusive effect it has in the state where it was rendered. See Nichols v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 506 F.3d 962, 967 (10th Cir. 2007).

    The district court held that under New Mexico issue-preclusion law Rowley’s coerced-confession claim was barred by the state criminal court’s denial of his motion to suppress his confession. It particularly relied on a New Mexico Court of Appeals decision, Albuquerque Police Department v. Martinez (In re Forfeiture of Fourteen

    Page 5

    Thousand Six Hundred Thirty Nine Dollars ($14,639) in U.S. Currency in Various Denominations & Two (2) Digital Pagers), 902 P.2d 563 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995), which addressed a very similar issue. In Forfeiture, police taking inventory of a crashed vehicle opened a closed duffle bag within the car and found cash and narcotics. See id. at 564-65. In the ensuing criminal proceeding against the driver, the trial court ruled the search unconstitutional, suppressed the evidence, and entered an order releasing all noncontraband evidence to the defendant. See id. at 565. Meanwhile, the police department had filed a petition for forfeiture of the money. The court dismissed the petition, concluding that it was precluded by the criminal case. See id. The court of appeals affirmed, writing that “we have no hesitation in giving collateral estoppel effect in a forfeiture proceeding to a prior decision on a motion to suppress in a criminal proceeding.” Id. at 569-70.

    Forfeiture is not binding on us because it is not a decision of New Mexico’s highest court. See Am. Cas. Co. of Reading Pa. v. Health Care Indem., Inc., 520 F.3d 1131, 1138 (10th Cir. 2008). But “we always have viewed intermediate state court opinions as indicia of the leanings of the state’s highest court and have followed suit unless other authority convinces us that the state supreme court would decide otherwise.” Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527, 1543 (10th Cir. 1992) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Absent any precedent or compelling argument to the contrary, we therefore infer that Forfeiture reflects what the New Mexico Supreme Court would have decided.

    Page 6

    Rowley’s opening brief on appeal presents no such precedent or argument. First, he argues that the issue in the criminal proceeding was not the same as the issue here. But he is wrong. Just as in this case, the question at the suppression hearing was whether the government could show by a preponderance of the evidence that his confession was voluntary. See State v. Setser, 932 P.2d 484, 486 (N.M. 1997).

    Next, he argues that the state-court ruling on his motion to suppress is not binding here because it was not a final judgment. But he cites no New Mexico case law in support of the asserted final-judgment requirement. He also makes no attempt to distinguish Forfeiture, which similarly gave preclusive effect to a ruling on a motion to suppress.1

    In his reply brief Rowley argues that Forfeiture is distinguishable because in that case the government could have appealed as of right whereas Rowley would have had to obtain a certification from the state trial court in order to appeal. Perhaps this is a meaningful distinction (and perhaps, although not argued by Rowley, it also matters that had Rowley appealed the suppression ruling that appeal would not have been decided before the nolle prosequi issued the next month). But an argument made for the first time in a reply brief comes too late. See Wheeler v. Comm’r, 521 F.3d 1289, 1291 (10th Cir. 2008). If Rowley wished to challenge the district court’s reasoning, he had to do so in his opening brief; but he does not even mention, much less distinguish, Forfeiture there.

    Page 7

    Rather, the only possible suggestion in his opening brief of an appealability requirement is a one-sentence parenthetical to an out-of-circuit citation in a footnote. See Aplt. Br. at 25 n.51. That will not do. See United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1131 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Arguments raised in a perfunctory manner, such as in a footnote, are waived.”). Further, the footnote does not deal with the district court’s statements that no New Mexico case has held that a ruling must be appealable to have preclusive effect and that Rowley could have sought permission for an interlocutory appeal of the suppression ruling. In short, Rowley’s opening brief is inadequate to preserve any challenge to the application of Forfeiture to his case. See Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 679 (10th Cir. 1998); United States v. Callwood, 66 F.3d 1110, 1115 n.6 (10th Cir. 1995) (“A litigant who mentions a point in passing but fails to press it by supporting it with pertinent authority forfeits the point.” (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted)).

    1. Miranda/Expert Witness

    Rowley claims that at one point during his interrogation he requested an attorney. After such a request an accused “is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.” Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 104 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prohibition against police-initiated interrogation lasts for 14 days. See id. at 109-110. Rowley alleges, however, that Defendants merely took a short break and then resumed their questioning. Police recordings of Rowley’s interrogation do not reflect a request for counsel.

    Page 8

    Rowley first mentioned his Miranda claim in his response to Defendants’ summary-judgment motion. The district court properly treated this new allegation as a request to amend the complaint. See Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (“[O]ur cases interpret the inclusion of new allegations in a response to a motion for summary judgment, as a potential request to amend the complaint.”). Noting that “[d]iscovery and dispositive motions deadlines have long since passed” and that “there is no excuse for failing to raise this claim earlier,” the district court denied the request to amend as untimely. Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 362.2

    We review the district court’s denial of a motion to amend under the abuse-of-discretion standard. Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far West Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185 (10th Cir. 1990). There was no abuse here. “Untimeliness alone may be a sufficient basis for denial of leave to amend”; and factors informing the timeliness inquiry include “whether the request was unduly and inexplicably delayed” and whether “the party had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and failed.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Rowley’s counsel (who represented him in the criminal case as well as this one) knew of his alleged request for counsel by the time of the state-court suppression hearing in February 2009, when Rowley testified that there “was one point in

    Page 9

    the statement that I kind of got upset, and I said that I wanted to stop talking to them, and that I thought it was time to get a lawyer.” Aplt. App., Vol. 3 at 259. And in his October 2013 deposition in the civil case, Rowley again testified in the presence of his counsel that he had requested an attorney during the interrogation. But Rowley did not seek to amend his complaint until April 2014.

    The only possible (and faintly argued) reason for delay is that Defendant was deterred from raising a Miranda claim because the video of his interrogation contradicted his memory of a request for counsel and he raised the claim only after realizing that the video had been tampered with. But the district court gave Rowley 90 days to produce expert evidence to support the tampering claim in a motion to reconsider, and he failed to deliver. Although he presented an affidavit from Jerry Goffe, who represented himself as a “forensic video examiner,” the court was unpersuaded of his expertise. Id., Vol. 4 at 1. All Rowley says in opposition to the court’s ruling is that the court failed to appreciate “Mr. Goffe’s decades of courtroom experience as a forensic video analyst dealing with the same issues or how his simple observations absolutely refute the notions advanced by the inexperienced Mr. Bennett [Defendants’ expert].” Aplt. Br. at 28. Rowley ignores the court’s explanation (1) that Goffe was “basically a court videographer. . . [with] no certifications, background or experience in information technology,” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 456; (2) that Goffe “merely viewed the recordings and compared them to the audio recording and transcript,” which the court could have done just as well, id. at 455; and (3) that “had Mr. Goffe made the most basic inquiry, [readily available facts] would have

    Page 10

    precluded him from coming to any of the conclusions he made,” id. at 459. We can hardly say that the court abused its discretion in failing to credit Goffe as an expert. See Dodge v. Cotter Corp., 328 F.3d 1212, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (absent challenge to whether the district court applied the proper standard and performed its gatekeeper role, review of exclusion of expert testimony is for abuse of discretion). There remains no reason to overturn the district court’s rejection of the attempt to add a Miranda claim.

    We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of Rowley’s request to amend. See Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage, 893 F.2d at 1185; Frank v. U.S. West, Inc., 3 F.3d 1357, 1365-66 (10th Cir. 1993).

    III. CONCLUSION

    We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of Rowley’s motion to amend. We GRANT Rowley’s motion to file a supplemental appendix.

    ENTERED FOR THE COURT

    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge

    ——–

    Footnotes:

    *. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

    1. Rowley also argues that he is not precluded here because he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter in state court, but he expressly limits this argument to his Miranda claim.
    2. The court also denied Rowley’s Miranda claim on the ground that it would be precluded by the state court’s denial of his motion to suppress his confession. We need not address this alternative ground, because we affirm the untimeliness ruling. See Kirch v. Embarq Mgmt. Co., 702 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[A]lthough the district court relied on consent as an alternative ground for summary judgment, we need not consider the issue because we [affirm on the principal ground].”).

    ——–

    [/column]

  • Peñasco Murder Trial

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    Peñasco man will face trial for second-degree murder in cousin’s stabbing

    A Peñasco man accused of stabbing his 22-year-old cousin will stand trial for second-degree murder after a magistrate judge rejected arguments Monday (Aug. 10) the charge against him be reduced to voluntary manslaughter. Manuel Leyba, 30, is accused of knifing Alex Vigil during an altercation June 19. After testimony from eight witnesses during a three-hour hearing Monday, Taos County Magistrate Judge Ernest Ortega advanced the case against Leyba to Eighth Judicial District Court, where it can proceed to trial.

    The attorney representing Leyba, Stephen Aarons, asked Ortega during the preliminary examination to advance the case with a lesser charge, suggesting Vigil provoked the fight that led to his death.

    Ortega said there was substantial evidence of aggression by Vigil. But he added lethal force was not warranted and that the evidence did not indicate sufficient provocation.

    Testimony Monday suggested the events that led to the ultimately fatal altercation outside Leyba’s Camino de la Acequia Madre home began at another residence with an argument between Vigil and his then-girlfriend. Tysha Sandoval testified Monday Vigil spent much of the evening at her home before a disagreement. Sandoval said Vigil beat her during the argument, after which she called her mother, who later arrived.

    Sandoval testified she left the residence with her mother, planning to leave Peñasco. The two women went to retrieve Sandoval’s 3-year-old child, who is the son of Leyba’s brother, James Leyba, Sandoval testified. But before leaving town, the young woman said they planned on taking the child to his father’s residence, where Manuel Leyba also resided. Vigil is said to have given chase in his car, purportedly running them off the road at one point. He allegedly pursued his then-girlfriend, her child and her mother to the Leyba residence.

    Witnesses testified Manuel and James Leyba went to meet Vigil at the entrance to their driveway. James Leyba testified Vigil was belligerent, shouting obscenities and demanding to see his girlfriend. An altercation reportedly ensued but witnesses provided testimony Monday that in some instances differed from their statements to Taos County Sheriff’s deputies shortly after the incident. Deputy Eighth Judicial District Attorney Emilio Chávez noted Monday that James Leyba initially denied witnessing the altercation when interviewed by law enforcement.

    James Leyba said Monday he saw the two men fight but disagreed with Chávez when the prosecutor recounted a statement in which he claimed to hear Vigil say “you stabbed me and I’m calling the cops.” Instead, James Leyba said Monday he was not aware Vigil had been stabbed or suffered serious injury during the incident. Vigil clutched his face, returned to his vehicle and drove at the brothers before speeding away, James Leyba said Monday.

    Manuel Leyba did not testify. Law enforcement were unequivocal that Vigil was stabbed, however. Vigil is said to have driven from the Leyba residence to his mother’s home nearby, telling her only that he was dying before collapsing on the building’s front steps. Zack Wright, then a Taos County Sheriff’s deputy, recounted arriving at the home after a 911 call to find Vigil unresponsive with stab wounds to his left rib cage, a cut on his forearm and an approximately six-inch laceration across his face.

    When Vigil’s mother suggested her son may have been injured at the Leyba residence, Wright said he drove to the home. There, the deputy measured an approximately 77-foot trail of blood along the road stemming from a puddle near the driveway. But everyone at the residence denied witnessing an altercation involving Vigil, Wright testified. Leyba had already left the home by the time law enforcement arrived shortly after midnight. It was not until a subsequent interview with a sergeant from the sheriff’s office that James Leyba recounted witnessing an altercation at the edge of the driveway. Sgt. Rick Romero testified James Leyba told him it appeared the men were boxing when Vigil exclaimed “you sliced me, bro.

    Copyright Taos News. Reprinted with Permission

    [/column]

  • State v. Pfauntsch (NM 2015)

    [column width=”1/1″ last=”true” title=”” title_type=”single” animation=”none” implicit=”true”]

    STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Plaintiff-Petitioner,
    v.
    JOSEF E. PFAUNTSCH, Defendant-Respondent.

    1. 34,476

    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

    February 9, 2015

    This decision was not selected for publication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of non-precedential dispositions. Please also note that this electronic decision may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Supreme Court.

    ORIGINAL PROCEEDING ON CERTIORARI
    Abigail P. Aragon
    , District Judge

    Hector H. Balderas, Attorney General
    Margaret E. McLean, Assistant Attorney General
    Pranava Upadrashta, Assistant Attorney General
    Santa Fe, NM

    for Petitioner

    Stephen D. Aarons
    Santa Fe, NM

    Page 2

    for Respondent

    DISPOSITIONAL ORDER OF REVERSAL

    MAES, JUSTICE

    {1} This appeal having come before the full Court and each Justice having read the briefs of the parties and otherwise being fully informed on the issues and applicable law as raised and briefed by the parties; and

    {2} The members of the Court having concurred that there is no reasonable likelihood that a Decision or Opinion would affect the disposition of this appeal or advance the law of the State; and

    {3} Acting within this Court’s discretion under Rule 12-405(B)(1) NMRA to dispose of a case by order, decision, or memorandum opinion rather than formal opinion;

    IT IS, THEREFORE, ADJUDGED THAT:

    {4} Defendant Josef E. Pfauntsch was charged by criminal information following a domestic dispute with his Russian-born wife. Represented by attorney Troy W. Prichard, Defendant entered into a written plea and disposition agreement. The written plea agreement included the following language: “I understand that entry of this plea agreement may have an effect upon my immigration or naturalization status,

    Page 3

    and I acknowledge that, if I am represented by an attorney, my attorney has advised me of the immigration consequences of this plea agreement.”

    {5} At the plea hearing, pursuant to the plea agreement, Defendant pleaded “no contest” to aggravated battery against a household member and criminal damage to property of a household member. During the plea colloquy, Defendant was asked by the district court if he was a citizen of the United States. He said yes. The district court approved the plea agreement and sentenced Defendant to three years of supervised probation. The next day and before the judgment and sentence was filed, Defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence and other relief, arguing that he should have been granted a conditional discharge, or in the alternative, be allowed to withdraw his plea.

    {6} When Defendant failed to report for his initial intake appointment, the State filed a motion to revoke Defendant’s probation for having violated the terms of his supervised probation. Defendant then filed a pro se motion to change his plea to not guilty, alleging that he was pressured into pleading no contest by his attorney and the district court, and that “[his] intelligence was clouded by the use of medical marijuana for several month[s] before and up to the morning of the plea agreement.” Defendant also claimed that there was no factual basis for some of the charges and that Prichard

    Page 4

    did not discuss the case with him or explain the consequences of a no contest plea. Defendant’s motion did not mention his immigration status.

    {7} Nearly nine months later, Defendant’s new counsel, Stephen D. Aarons, filed a motion to withdraw the plea agreement. Defendant specifically cited Prichard’s failure to discuss any possible immigration issues and claimed he was “ineffective per se in failing to make any inquiry as to [D]efendant’s status as a citizen born in Germany who had . . . later emigrated to the United States.”

    {8} After a hearing, the district court issued an order denying Defendant’s motion to set aside his plea. The district court made a factual finding that when Defendant was questioned by the court during the plea hearing, he stated affirmatively that he was a citizen of the United States. The court concluded that Defendant “cannot complain of ineffective assistance of counsel where he is responsible for the lack of information provided to his counsel and the misinformation provided to this court.”

    {9} Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw his plea to the Court of Appeals. He argued

    that he was improperly advised of the immigration consequences of the plea, contrary to State v. Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, 136 N.M. 533, 101 P.3d 799, which requires attorneys to determine their clients’ immigration status and advise them of the specific consequences of a plea agreement on their immigration status and that it was therefore error for the district court to deny his motion to withdraw the plea.

    Page 5

    State v. Pfauntsch, No. 31,674, mem. op. ¶ 1 (N.M. Ct. App. Nov. 26, 2013) (non-precedential). The first sentence in the memorandum opinion filed by the Court of Appeals begins: “Defendant Pfauntsch, a German national and United States permanent resident.”1 Pfauntsch, No. 31,674, mem. op. ¶ 1 (emphasis added). Based on this reliance, the memorandum opinion concluded that Defendant had established that Prichard’s “performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney when counsel failed to advise Defendant of the immigration consequences of a ‘no contest’ plea. Defendant has also made a prima facie showing that justifies holding an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was prejudiced by his counsel’s omission.” Id. ¶ 20. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court and remanded to the district court for a determination of whether Defendant was prejudiced by counsel’s ineffectiveness. Id.

    {10} The State petitioned for a writ of certiorari on the sole issue of:

    Did the New Mexico Court of Appeals err when it found that Defendant established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel where Defendant affirmatively misrepresented his immigration status during the plea colloquy to the district court, Op. ¶ 2: “At the plea

    Page 6

    hearing, the district court conducted a plea colloquy during which Defendant told the district court that he was a United States citizen”?

    Nine days later, the State filed a motion asking “this Court to take judicial notice of Defendant’s [United States] passport and other documentation, or, in the alternative, moves for a limited remand for an evidentiary hearing.” We granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and the State’s motion to take judicial notice. See State v. Pfauntsch, 2014-NMCERT-005.

    {11} “Proof of ineffective assistance is two-fold: (1) [the d]efendant must show that counsel’s performance fell below that of a reasonably competent attorney, and (2) [the d]efendant also must prove that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” State v. Hester, 1999-NMSC-020, ¶ 9, 127 N.M. 218, 979 P.2d 729 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A]n affirmative misrepresentation by counsel as to the deportation consequences of a guilty plea is today objectively unreasonable.” Paredez, 2004-NMSC-036, ¶ 15 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The second prong of the ineffectiveness test hinges on “whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process.” Id. ¶ 20 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). That is, “[the d]efendant must show he would not have entered into the plea agreement if he had

    Page 7

    been given constitutionally adequate advice about the effect that his . . . plea would have on his immigration status.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

    {12} Our judicial notice established that Defendant was born in Germany and later became a United States citizen through the naturalization process. Therefore, Defendant is a United States citizen and not a permanent legal resident. For reasons unknown, Defendant’s U.S. citizenship was not established until Defendant’s wife’s attorney contacted Appellate Counsel and came forward with a copy of Defendant’s United States passport.

    {13} Naturalization is the manner in which a person not born in the United States voluntarily becomes a United States citizen. See USCIS Policy Manual Citizenship and Naturalization Guidance, available at http://www.uscis.gov/citizenship/teach ers/naturalization-information. A naturalized United States citizen can only have his or her citizenship stripped through a process called “denaturalization.” See U.S.C § 1451 (2013). Grounds for denaturalization are: (1) falsification or concealment of relevant facts related to the naturalization application process; (2) refusal to testify before Congress; (3) membership in subversive groups; and (4) dishonorable military discharge. U.S.C § 1451. Former citizens who are denaturalized are subject to removal (deportation) from the United States. See id. The grounds for

    Page 8

    denaturalization are limited and “the government bears a heavy burden of proof in denaturalization proceedings, and a court should only revoke citizenship if the government presents clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence establishing that citizenship was illegally procured.” United States v. Jean-Baptiste, 395 F.3d 1190, 1192 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

    {14} The Court of Appeals engaged in an ineffective assistance of counsel analysis on the false premise that Defendant was not a United States citizen and was subject to deportation. Even so, Defendant still argues that he was prejudiced because he could still be subject to immigration consequences.

    {15} Defendant is a citizen of the United States. A United States citizen cannot be deported. The four grounds for denaturalization do not include any of the crimes committed by Defendant. Therefore, Defendant is not subject to deportation or denaturalization consequences by the entry of the plea and the conviction. Accordingly, an ineffective assistance of claim for failure to advise of immigration or naturalization consequences is not available when Defendant’s status is a United States citizen.

    {16} Defendant also argues that he was coerced by Prichard and the district court to enter the plea, that he was influenced by the use of marijuana, and that Prichard

    Page 9

    misrepresented that Defendant would not have any conditions of probation. Those issues are not properly before this Court, and further, those issues are now moot since Defendant has already served his probation.

    {17} We reverse the Court of Appeals because its memorandum opinion was based on a false premise, and Defendant cannot suffer any immigration or denaturalization consequences. The district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea is affirmed.

    {18} IT IS SO ORDERED.

    /s/_________
    PETRA JIMINEZ MAES, Justice

    /s/_________
    BARBARA J. VIGIL, Chief Justice

    /s/_________
    RICHARD C. BOSSON, Justice

    /s/_________
    EDWARD L. CHÁVEZ, Justice

    /s/_________
    CHARLES W. DANIELS, Justice
    ——–

    Footnotes:

    1. Lawful permanent resident is any person not a citizen of the United States who is residing in the United States under legally recognized and lawfully recorded permanent residence as an immigrant. See www.uscis.gov/tools/glossary.

    [/column]